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PREFACE
This dissertation is about success in urban education.
about the factors which militate against success

— lethargy,

fear, bureaucratic indifference and white racism.

It

is also

pessimism,

Whether injustices

against poor and minority children stem from racial or class prejudice
is immaterial.

In American society, poverty and racial discrimination

are intertwined.

What is most important is carving new routes out of

the morass of low expectations and institutionalized failure in urban

schools

Each chapter looks at existing myths that serve to perpetuate failure.

Chapter

I

examines the phenomenon of "blaming the victims."

The

intellectual myths of "the culture of poverty," "the disadvantaged," and
racial inferiority are scrutinized, along with their impact on educational research, policy, and practices.

Chapter II challenges the myth that integration

particular

— cannot

work.

— and

bussing in

In light of current political agitation to com-

bat bussing, examining the role of leadership in seeking positive solu-

tions to racial separation is timely.

Chapter III presents numerous examples of success in urban schools.

Enough Kozol-tvpe horror stories have been written.

Some urban schools

manv
succeed; some teachers and administrators care and are effective:

middleghetto children are achieving as well as or better than their
class peers.

iii

"

Chapter IV explores some non-public and non-school alternatives,
from street academies to Sesame Street

,

that have potential impact in

Each example has challenged the myth that private citi-

urban education.

zens and non-professionals cannot change the educational status quo.

Chapter V examines educational change theory and draws some conclusions about successful change processes.
tioned:
(2)

(1)

Two related myths are ques-

the myth that a recipe for change can be formulated; and

the myth of powerlessness.

Combating all these myths requires

creating an illusion of power based on the hope factor that life can be
better and that people’s actions can make a difference.
In preparing this dissertation, my most valuable resource has been

my experience as

a.

member of the Center for Urban Education.

Through

participating in the growth of the Center from "a sign on the door

to

and faculty
an integrated group of over sixty-five graduate students

Opportunities
and over 450 undergraduates in teacher training and Career

Programs,
factor
I

I

have learned most about urban education and

the hope

.

Atron A.
would like to thank, first of all. Associate Dean

and Director of the Center
Gentry, member of my dissertation committee
years.
for Urban Education during its developing

Atron Gentry has taught

us all the meaning of "the hope factor."

Professor Byrd

L.

and my
Jones, present Director of the Center

many insights, a tough critic of
major advisor, has been the source of

my ideas, and

a

writing of this
crucial support in the research and
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paper.

I

would like to thank John

'C.

Woodbury, Assistant to the

Chancellor of New York City Schools and former member of the Center.

Jack supported me in my first contributions to the Center and opened

many doors for me in New York in researching this dissertation.
Assistant Professor Glenn Hawkes and Associate Provost Robert

L.

Woodbury, advisors for my dissertation, have both provided skillful criticism and warm support.

Associate Professor Reg Damerell has been

a

unique

source of insight as author of an outstanding book on integration and
as a member of my advisory committee.
I

would also like to thank the students and staff in the Center

for Urban Education who assisted in the typing and editing of this paper:

Jo-Ann Pimental, Diane Briggs, Libby Parke, and Richard Schaye.

Many
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the answer to the question of the
best way to teach "the disadvantaged"
is embarrassingly simple
namely, to
teach them with the same expectations
the same acceptance of their humanity
and their educability and, therefore,
with the same effectiveness as one
would teach the more privileged child

—

Kenneth Clark
New York Times

,

January 17, 1970

CHAPTER

I

MYTHS AND ISSUES IN URBAN EDUCATION

Any study of urban education must begin with the recognition that
the distinctive features of inner city teaching and learning result

from institutionalized white racism.

In the United States, dominant

classes have both actively devised and passively maintained institution-

alized forms of oppression for poor and minority citizens.

Schools have

served as primary instruments for the inequality which further condemns

minorities to poverty.

Discrimination is so ingrained in social behav-

ior and institutions that it can survive without conscious intent to

oppress.

Maintaining the status quo suffices for white Americans.

A peculiar dynamic has occurred when white liberal reformers have
tried to discuss white racism.

crimination
children

— specifically

— they

While identifying the patterns of dis-

the failures of urban schools to educate

have felt it necessarv to prescribe a general cure.

But

too often their remedies have misplaced the responsibility on the

minority populations and have become another variety of "blaming the
victim."

Most solutions and panaceas for the crisis in urban education

have rested on myths, generated bv white liberal intellectuals, which

have placed the burden of changing education on those whom the system
has failed

— poor

and minority children and their families.

The myths have been most destructive because they are partial

truths

— which

are inadequate as a basis for successful change

2

strategies.

1

Often, they have taken pieces of truth— black children

learning in schools, poor hones provide less enriched environments, ghettoes are dangerous places to grow up in

— and

have turned

them into the basis for elaborate theories of social action which

avoided treating the basic forces of racism and bigotry.
Part of the motivation for accepting the myths has been the

desire for ready answers and solutions.

Panaceas— from Head Start,

compensatory education, special education, and programmed learning to

decentralization

— have

risen on the horizon, brought fame and sometimes

fortune to their proponents, and faded into the larger storv of failure
in urban schools.

It

is not

surprising that, after the failure of

these strategies, a Jensen would appear, propounding the biggest myth
of all

— that

Negroes are genetically inferior.

The myths which have preoccupied social reformers since James B.

Conant

'

s

Slums and Suburbs (1961) have been destructive because thev

have diverted attention from the basic underlying causes of uneaual

educational opportunity and results in urban schools.

Yet to denv the

ready answers and partial truths is to raise the specter of despair.
If Head Start, compensatory education, or decentralization are not the

^Obviously "myth" means more than this definition. Anthropologist
Claude Levi-Strauss has described mvths in manv cultures as stories
In Virgin Land Henrv
that "try to explain why things are as thev are."
that fuses
construction
Nash Smith has defined mvth as "an intellectual
"collective
concept and emotion into an image" and that derives as
representations rather than the work of a single mind." If mvths have
a functional purpose in institutionalized white racism, it is to offer
some explanation which excuses inactivity and reconciles a belief in
equality with unequal conditions.
.

.

3

answer, what is?

If white racism is the cause of the failure of urban

schools, how can change be realized?

While it is crucial to identify correctly the cause, solutions
may not necessarily lie with eliminating the cause (racist belief among
white Americans)

,

but in dealing directly with the results (oppressive

acts against minority and poor Americans)

.

Bringing an end to white

institutionalized racism will probably not occur by waiting for a
personal "conversion" of every white American, but by changing the
status quo

— by

dealing with behavior, not attitudes.

The overwhelming

magnitude of causes does not deny the possibility of solutions.
dominant social attitude of white racism can be combated
one sure-fire strategy

— then

— if

The

not through

through a whole set of alternatives.

To put it another way, spending more money on schools does not

eradicate racism, as the practice of Southern districts to pour more

money into black segregated schools demonstrated.

Yet a degrading

physical environment makes more intense the experience of discrimination
in ghetto schools.

And the lack of financial incentive for good

teachers and administrators to serve in city schools lessens the hope
of ghetto communities for better educational opportunities.

Fresh

paint on the walls and better teachers cannot eliminate racism, but

they can provide the hope for urban communities that education can

improve

4

1.

The Culture of Poverty

The culture of poverty concept was a consistent outgrowth of urban

welfare programs and social science research.

It implied that one seg-

ment of the society was sick relative to a generally healthy society.
The assumption proceeded on the idea that the ghetto
crime, illnesses, filth

— was

— its

poverty,

spontaneously maintained, if not self-

created, rather than a result of the overt and covert racism of the
larger society.
It implied that ghetto behavior was normative by choice.

But how

could one describe normative behavior of people forced into a highly

abnormal environment?

Was evidence of malnutrition among welfare

children the result of

a

culture of poverty or of a system designed to

punish children unfortunate enough to be born poor?

In fact, the

behavior of ghetto, residents is a remarkably adaptive and life-affirming

response to intolerable conditions.

When schools kill the interest,

motivation, and self-repect of children, they leave--a realistic and

healthy response.
The anthropologist Charles A. Valentine traced the development of
the concept of the culture of poverty that equated "nonconformity with

middle-class norms" with "instability and disorganization."

2

The

influential "Moynihan Report" in 1965 called Negro Americans "not equal
to most of those groups with which they will be competing" and predicted

^Charles A. Valentine, Culture and Poverty (Chicago:
of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 27.

The University

5

that so long as their weak family structure persisted, "the cycle of

poverty and disadvantage will continue to repeat itself." 3

Valentine pointed out that "if there is anything that serious
scholars of culture have learned, it is not to assume that a family is
'broken' just because the official census records show no resident male

heading the household; not to jump to the conclusion that a woman is
'alone' merely because she appears on the census roles as 'deserted;' or

that a child has necessarily been 'abandoned' just because a service

agency reports that its father is absent."^

Such statistical pronounce-

ments reflected not only condescending ignorance of the life necessities
for poor and minority families, they became tools for the systematic

attack on those families.

Malcolm X's childhood (born Malcolm Little) illustrated the overwhelming forces of a white racist society.
murdered by white bigots.

Malcolm X's father was

His mother worked hard to feed and cloth the

children, but was eventually forced to accept welfare.

Malcolm described

the prying and condescension of the social workers:

When the state Welfare people began coming to our house, we
would come from school sometimes and find them talking with
They acted and
our mother, asking a thousand questions.
looked at her, and at us, and around in our house, in a way
that had about it the feeling at least for me that we
In their eyesight we were just things
were not people.
3
that was all.

—

—

,

The Case for National Action
Moynihan, The Negro Family
U. S. Department of Labor, 1965), p. i.

3 Daniel P.

(Washington:

^Valentine, Culture and Poverty

:

,

p.

35.

’Malcolm X, Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York:
1966), p. 12.

Grove Press,

.

.

6

One by one, Mrs. Little's children .were taken away from her by state

welfare agencies.

She finally collapsed mentally and was hospitalized.

The story of the Little family's destruction would be registered
in the records of social welfare as a typical example of a black family’s

"social disintegration."

Of the racist murder of the father and the

inhumane removal of the children, there would be no mention.

Malcolm X's

prison sentence would be cited as the result of an unstable family

background
One white social scientist studying the so-called culture of

poverty went beyond racist assumptions and saw ghetto families in the
context of the oppressive forces they faced.

In Tally's Corner

,

Elliot

Liebow portrayed the resourcefulness, courage, and despair of young
black men trapped in the Washington,

D.

C.

ghetto economy.

He told

the characteristic story of the optimistic young man who sought work,

received a subsistence-level job, faced hostility and discrimination,
was layed off or became sick, found he could not adequately support
his wife and family, and finally stopped trying.

Richard, known and respected as one of the hardest-working men on
the street had told the author:

"I figure you got to get out there and

You got to try before you can get anything."

try.

later, Richard saw no hope:

But a few months

"I've been scuffling for five years from

morning till night and my kids still don't have anything, and
have anything

.

Where would be the motivation for Richard

^Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner (Boston:
67-68
1967)
pp
,

.

s

I

don't

chilcre..

Little, Brown and Company,

7

to study hard and "get out there and try?"

Unskilled jobs, as Liebow

learned, offered a dead end in advancement, permanence, or security:

"Neither hard work nor perseverance can conceivably carry the janitor
to a sit-down job in the office building he cleans up."

And this cycle of despair and poverty passed from generation to

generation, not by "cultural transmission," but "from the fact that the
son goes out and independently experiences the same failures, in the

same areas, and for much the same reasons as his father.

The cycle

of poverty is perpetuated, not by a culture of poverty, but by unabated

discrimination and despair.
The bitterness and frustration with which ghetto families viewed
the culture of poverty concept put upon their lives was understandable.

One black teacher aide working in Brooklyn schools wrote:
If I created a game for people to play, and I made up all
the rules, I would be foolish not to come out on top all
How can we beat them
It*’ s as simple as that
the time.
want to play the game
really
don’t
I
at their own game?
all I wish is that
must,
a
with them, but seeing that it's

—

they play fair.®
In The Choice:

The Issue of Black Survival in America

,

Samuel F.

Yette revealed the extremes to which the culture of poverty concept had

been taken.

The concept ultimately became a weapon, not for understand-

to
ing or improving the lives of poor people, but for discovering how

get rid of an essentially troublesome element in American society.

^Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner

,

pp.

63,

223.

The
^Brooklyn COP paraprof essional quoted in Urban Education
Spring,
published,
Hope Factor (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, to be
1972), p. 179 in final draft.
:

,

In

—
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a

memo to President Nixon shortly before the inauguration in 1969,

Moynihan defined "a clear national goal":
must be dissolved."

that "the Negro lower-class

He explained that by "lower-class" he meant "low

income, marginally employed, poorly educated, disorganized slum dwellers

who have piled up in our central cities over the past quarter century."
Moynihan'

s

insulting word choice was matched by his minimal expecta-

tions for these people:

They are not going to become capitalists, nor even middleclass functionaries.
But it is fully reasonable to conceive
of them being transformed into a stable working class populaTruck drivers, mail carriers, assembly-line workers
tion:
people with dignity, purpose, and in the United States a very
good standard of living indeed.
Common justice, and common
that
this be done.^
sense, demands
In the name of "common justice and common sense," Moynihan mapped out a

future of second-class citizenship for America's powerless and poor.

2.

Compensatory Education

The myth of the culture of poverty would be harmless if it remained
buried in the ivory towers of academic research.

But the myth (and its

corollaries) has had profound influence on federal educational programs
and local educational practices in urban districts.

It has supported a

widespread belief in the concept of ghetto children as "disadvantaged"
and the tactic of compensatory education.

Again, the myth contains a portion of the truth.
inner cities are often "disadvantaged"

— they

Children in the

are exposed to higher crime

The Issue of Black Survival
^Samuel F. Yette, The Choice
Sons,
1971), p. 87.
America (New York: G. P. Putnam's
:

jin

9

rates, drug problems, police brutality, and bureaucratic indifference.

Many have serious health problems, live in substandard housing, and,
above all, suffer the indignity of being poor and black in America.

Urban schools receive less financial resources than outlaying suburban
schools.

In 1965, suburban districts spent $573 per pupil while central

city districts spent $449."^

Unequal education and economic discrimination have produced a
clear picture of racial injustice.

For decades Blacks have earned an

income about 60 percent of that for whites.

In inner cities, from one

quarter to close to one half of young black males are unemployed.

In

New York City, "An overwhelming majority of black students do not
graduate from high school and, of those who do,

below the seventh grade

level."''''*'

a

majority are reading

To be poor and black in America is

clearly a "disadvantage."
But social reformers have seized this partial truth and placed
the blame for inadequate education on those environmental factors,

largely exonerating the schools and the larger society.

The assumption

behind compensatory education is that somehow the fault is in the child

with "low aspirations" who is unable to "delay gratification" and his
Such attitudes are

parents who present "weak models of success."

reflected in an essay by Bruno Bettelheim on "Teaching the Disadvantaged"

:

10Wilson C. Riles, The Urban Education Task Force Report (New York
Praeger, Inc., 1970) p. 51.
11 Urban Education:

The Hope Factor

,

p.

8.

^

:

10

remarked that we all -agreed on the great need to teach
these children socialized behavior... I pointed out that
the middle-class child can usually learn good manners by
observing his parents, whereas about the only way the
under-privileged child can learn them is by observing
his teachers. ^
I

Too many "experts" on the "disadvantaged" have felt comfortable with

such middle-class moralism.

Later, in the same essay, Bettelheim

described the dilemma of the teacher who inadvertantly encouraged
ghetto children to steal money from her purse.

He explained the

incident in terms of a different culture of poverty

poverty

— morals

— even

"morals of

very different from ours":

Within this culture of poverty it is perfectly all right
to take things from the out-group as long as you never
take from the in-group.

Even if there was a shred of truth in the statement that some children
had a different view of stealing than others, Bettelheim set up an

explanation which, instead of helping teachers overcome their middleclass judgments, encouraged a condescending view of "those children."

How

a

parent felt when she heard her children described in such

terms was communicated in an interview with a ghetto parent by Robert

Coles

l^James C. Stone and Frederick W. Schneider, eds., Teaching In The
Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970),
Inner City,
^ A Book of Readings (New York:
p.

179'

l^stone and Schneider,

p.

181.
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Then they take my kids to the Head Start thing, and first
thing I hear is the boys’ fingernails is dirty, and they
isn't eating the proper food, and they can't use the right
words, and the words they do use, no one can make them out...
They tell you they want to help you, but if you ask me they
want to make you into them, and leave you without a cent of
yourself left to hang on to. lZ>
The myth that labeled poor and minority children as "disadvantaged"
and "culturally handicapped" led to a variety of programs and policies

which were misdirected at best and reinforced white racism at worst.
The assumption led to lowered expectations and thereby lower educational

results.

Schools have opted not to accept the challenge to educate

poor and minority children but to use environmental factors as an excuse
for inaction.

"Whatever pathology may exist in Negro families,"

Martin Luther King pointed out, "is far exceeded by this social pathology in the school system that refuses to accept a responsibility that
no one else can bear and then scapegoats Negro families for failing
15
to do the job."

Assuming that a child from the inner city was a cripple and that
his society was healthy lead to a cycle of mistakes.

A child was viewed

crutches.
as needing therapy, special treatment, and educational

If ke

to comcould survive such paternalistic help, then he might be ready

pete with other, more advantaged children.

As Charles Valentine

'middle
sarcastically phrased it, "In short, the poor must become

^Stone and Schneider, Teaching
15 Mart in Luther King, Jr.
Harper and Row, 1967), p. 225.

,

in the Inner Clty_, p.

137.

Where Do We Go From Here? (New York:

.
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class,’ perhaps through ’psychiatric treatment,’ and then we shall see

what can be done about their poverty

Common sense, as well as some unbiased research, has challenged
the concept of "disadvantaged" children.

Through the "color-blind"

eye of television, children of all backgrounds have been brought

together in the classroom of Sesame Street
Sesame Street

,

.

After the first year of

Educational Testing Service researched the learning gains

of children who watched the show.

The ETS report concluded that chil-

dren who watched the most, learned the most, regardless of background.

Three year olds who watched more than older four and five year olds
gained more in the skills tested.

Most significantly, "children from

disadvantaged backgrounds who watched the program more than middle-class
children learned more than their advantaged

7

peers."''"'

When educators and bureaucrats called some children "disadvantaged,"
they said more about their own shortcomings and prejudices than about
the children's social and economic deprivation.

The equality of

opportunity and results provided in the non-school setting of Sesame
Street exposed the compensatory education myth.

3.

The Failure of Educational Research

Between the Supreme Court desegregation ruling (1954) and the
Coleman Report (1966)

,

educational research contributed practically

l6 Charles Valentine,

Culture and Poverty

,

p.

75.

Major Findings
Samuel Bell and Gerry Ann Bogatz, "A Summary of the
New
(Princeton,
Evaluation’,
An
in ’The First Year of Sesame Street:
1970).
Educational Testing Service, October,
Jersey:
17

.
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nothing to illuminate what equality of education
should and could be.
The Supreme Court ruled that separate educational
facilities could
not be equal.

It did not say that integrated facilities would
neces-

sarily be equal.

The conclusion most people drew from that decade of

educational research was, however, that black children could learn
only when they sat in class next to white children.

Educational research failed to clarify the issues and stimulate
reform in urban education because it refused to ask the important

questions or examine the crucial factors.

Instead of considering urban

problems, researchers looked for any explanation other than white

racism to explain social phenomena in the ghettoes.
Combined with that timidity was the intellectual narrowness of

restricting research to factors that could easily be measured.

Thus

the presence of an encyclopedia in the parent's home became more

important as a research variable than a teacher's belief that a child
could learn.

Certainly, prejudiced beliefs and the effects of racism

are difficult to quantify and measure, but no factors are more important
in investigating the failures of urban education.

The massive, painstakingly executed Coleman Report, Equality of

Educational Opportunity

,

was a patent example of the "triumph of

sophisticated research design over common sense."

18

After proving what

had already been proven, that race and ethnicity have a major effect on

achievement, Coleman adopted

a

standard research procedure for dealing

^William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York:
p

.

43

Pantheon Books, 1971),

.

.

14

with the gap between the achievement of black and white children.

He

divided his research into the two racial groups explaining that, "When

achievement differs as much as it does between these groups, then to

analyze the groups together, without controlling for race or ethnicity
of the student, wou^d cause any school characteristics highly associated

with race or ethnicity to show

a

spurious relation to achievement

Constrained by a standard research procedure, Coleman avoided the real
question:

Why does the gap exist?

Coleman found that, of the factors he measured, economic background
of students had the highest correlation with academic achievement.

finding surprised no one.

That

Unfortunately, Coleman and those who studied

his research usually extrapolated a cause and effect relationship

between poverty and low achievement.

Since most of the poor urban

students were black, he could just as well have concluded that they did
not achieve because they were black

— the

conclusion that Jensen did

extract
Instead, Coleman adhered to the "cultural deprivation" assumption
that he and his researchers brought to the study.

No attention was

given to the fact that poor black children achieved basically the same
as their white middle-class classmates in the early grades and that a

gap appeared around third grade which continued to widen in successive

That progressive inequality of results could hardly be explained

years.

19 James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington
p. 311.
G.P.O.
1966)
,

,

.
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in terms of

cultural disadvantage," family background, and home

environment
The follow-up study of the Coleman Report by the Civil Rights

Commission,

Racial Isolation in the United States," convincingly con-

firmed the fact that compensatory education had little effect on improving educational achievement and that a strategy that produced more

equal results was integration.

effort discovered the obvious

Again, a serious, massive research

— that

a

child’s race more than anything

else determines his success in American schools.

Neither study seri-

ously considered the possibility that white racism might be the primary
cause of lower achievement for black children

— either

because of

racially biased tools for measurement or because of the damaging

psychological effects of discrimination or because of the racial biases
of teachers.

While both research studies were well-intentioned, their conclusions opened the door for racist interpretations of their findings.

The

Winter, 1969, issue of the Harvard Educational Review published the

findings of Dr. Arthur Jensen that the lower I.Q. scores of Negroes
and the failure of compensatory education, plus his dubious contention

that intelligence is 80 percent inherited, all pointed to the conclusion

that Negroes are genetically inferior to whites when it comes to cogni-

tive learning.
At least on one level, Jensen did look at the question which other

studies assiduously avoided

— the

role of race in academic achievement.

But Jensen looked at race and ignored racism.

Beyond the racist

.
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conclusions of his research is the charge that they are absurdly
useless
and potentially damaging.

Even if it could be proven that intelligence

is largely inherited (with or without correlation to race)

,

such

knowledge could only have damaging use in classrooms, where each child
is an individual example in a wide range of capabilities.

that girls

ajs

a.

If we knew

group were inherently more intelligent than boys by

some measure such as cognitive learning, that fact would have no bearing
on whether any individual girl
boy.

were more intelligent than any individual

Although Jensen should have been dismissed as a travesty of aca-

demic scholarship, his impact is very much with us

— the

damage has been

done
Some research in urban education has gone beyond endless repeti-

tions of the problems, racist conclusions and faulty cause and effect

assumptions.

Two similar studies by James Jones and Kenneth Clark in

Harlem, and by William Ryan in Roxbury, investigated the validity of
the theory of cultural deprivation and achieved almost identical

results.

20

The design of the studies was simple.

If cultural depriva-

tion was the prime cause of lower achievement, then its effects should
be observable within a population of all black or predominantly black

schools.

The researchers compared two types of schools within Harlem

and Roxbury:

schools where the majority of the children were from poor,

"deprived" homes, and schools where most of the children were from
stable homes which would not be called "deprived" by any measure.

^William Ryan, Blaming the Victim

,

pp

.

53-56.
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In both Harlem and Roxbury, the pattern of achievement was

remarkably similar.

In the early grades there were no significant

differences between the presumably culturally deprived children and
the more advantaged children.

But by the fifth and sixth grades, the

culturally deprived children began to fall farther and farther behind.
The most sensible conclusion to draw from these studies is that something happens to a poor and minority child within the schools or within
the larger society as he grows older which cripples his ability or

motivation.

4.

Racism and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The James and Clark study collected data on teachers’ expectations
in the Harlem schools

— their

views of the academic potentials of their

students and their predictions of their futures.

The study concluded

that the major factor accounting for student decline in achievement was

the teachers' attitudes:

"Less is expected of such pupils; they are

rewarded for poor performance, and the result is a steadily increasing
gap between what they accomplish and what pupils at their grade level

should accomplish."^

Those findings concurred with Kenneth Clark's

contention that so-called "disadvantaged" youth do not learn because
they are not taught.

The phenomenon of lowered expectations for poor and minority

students has been institutionalized in the practice of tracking.

21 William Ryan, Blaming the Victim

,

p.

56.

When
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implemented with good intentions, tracking has had
questionable benefits,
but

in urban schools,

tracking has become a powerful weapon against

uncooperative and undesirable students.

James Herndon, in The Wav It

Spo-zed To Be, reported the story of Virgil, a student

in the eighth

and lowest track:
I went down the next day before class and looked up
old
Virgil's 1.0.
It happened to be, at last testing, 138.
I was going to ask one of the counselors just what
he was
doing in group H, but while I waited for them to show up
I read farther down the card.
After a lot of written
comments like "troublemaker" and "adjustment difficulty
to classroom situation" and a couple of referral dates
to Juvenile Hall, I found the letter H, followed by the
words Teacher Recommendation 2.

Under the guise of individualizing instruction and opportunity, tracking, "special education" for problem students, and elitist special

high schools in urban systems have served to perpetrate class lines
and racial exclusion.

Recent studies by Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson have pro-

vided data which demonstrated the effects of teacher expectations on
student achievement

— the

self-fulfilling prophecy.

Despite flawed

research techniques, their study exnosed the cause and effect relationship between expectation and performance and demonstrated the suscepti-

bility of teachers to suggestion.
The researchers subtly gave teachers access to some "planted"

information which identified some of the students as potential
"spurters"

— students

^ James
1969)

,

p.

32.

who would excel later in the year after a slow

Herndon, The Way It Spozed To Be (New York:

Bantam Books,

—
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stsrt.

In fact,

tins

spurte,rs

were randomly chosen.

Rosenthal and

Jacobson found that the "spurters" did in fact make greater gains than
their classmates throughout the school year.

Further, in studying

teacher attitudes towards various students, Rosenthal and Jacobson
found that teachers exhibited an unfavorable response to children who

progressed when they were not expected to.

7a

Usually, new teachers in urban schools do not willfully fall into

preconceived assumptions about their students.

Through diaries of new

teachers, Estelle Fuchs studied how optimistic expectations changed to

puzzlement, confusion, and finally resignation to the pervasive belief
r\ /

that poor and minority children cannot learn.

Teaching and Learning in City Schools

,

4

Eleanor Leacock, in

observed the same phenomenon.

New teachers began "with the assumption that all children can learn as
Disillusioned by the many diffi-

something of a question or a wish."

culties of teachin'g in an inner city school and confused by the threat
of failure,

the teacher "does not turn the responsibility back on him-

self or (at least in any open way) on the school system.

It

is easier

to place the responsibility where he is told at every turn it lies

with the children."

In self-defense, the teacher who feels unable to

^Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion

in the Classroom

Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Teacher Expectations (New York:
Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).

Holt,

Views From Inside City Schools
^Estelle Fuchs, Teachers Talk
(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969).
2

:

York
^Eleanor Leacock, Teaching and Learning in City Schools (New
p. 205.
Basic Books, 1969)
2

,

.
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be effective scolds his children for "not getting it,"
covers up intel-

lectual confusions with shallow moralisms, and privately, even
openly,

describes the problem as one of "motivation."

Leacock

ElScitior

s

studies concluded that the teachers' expectations

of their students correlated highly with the race and social status
of

the students.

And whether the teachers and students were black or

white was less relevant than the social status of the students and the
teachers' preconceptions of the future roles those students would perform in society.

Concerning the goals of education, for example, the

teachers of middle-class students spoke of "love of learning" while the

teachers of lower-class students spoke of "acceptable standards of

behavior."

The teachers in the middle-income classrooms generally

made higher demands of their students, both academically and behaviorally

Furthermore, the positive feelings of teachers towards students

were influenced by the relationship between economic status and academic

achievement of the students.

In the middle-income schools, the

children whom the teachers felt most positive about had average I.Q.
scores some eleven points higher than those toward whom they felt
negative.

In the lower class Negro school, the case was exactly the

opposite.

The children the teachers felt positive or neutral toward

had average I.Q. scores almost ten points lower than those about whom

they felt negative.

"As can be seen, the teachers' evaluations of

the children parallel the children's status as groups in the eyes of
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society, with Negro lower than white, low- income lower than middle-

income

.

What urban schools are doing to poor and minority students is not

simply imposing middle-class values on them but conveying middle-class
att itudes towards them.

"blaming the victim."

The common thread is what William Ryan called

Racism and class prejudice are at the core of the

failure of urban education to provide equal educational opportunity for
poor and minority Americans.

The question that haunts that accusation is whether a fair chance
in school will be enough to counteract the larger society’s prophecy of

failure for these children.

Schools are only one part of the pattern

of institutionalized white racism.

part

—a

But they are an immensely influential

child spends most of twelve years in a classroom.

Providing

hope for poor and minority children in urban schools can only occur
as part of providing hope for them in the larger society.

The spiral

of hopelessness has an analogy in a spiral of hopefulness and change.

The myths that are challenged in this and the following chapters

carry out Kenneth Clark's reminder that "disadvantaged" children learn

when they are adequately taught.

Urban schools that succeed not only

contradict the myth of failure but also help to create hope that can
feed upon itself in a reversal of the self-fulfilling prophecy of

failure.

26 Eleanor Leacock, pp.

136, 195.
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A P T E'R

SUBURBS AND CITIES:

II

SEPARATION AND INTEGRATION

The primary impact of white racism upon urban schools has been

racial separation.

That separation has maintained inner city ghettoes

of concentrated populations, poverty and crime, deteriorated and over-

crowded housing.

Control of everything from schools, stores, and

garbage collection to petty rackets has stayed in the hands of outsiders,

mostly white, who exploited the ghetto existence.'*'
The fact of racial separation has created a long list of euphemisms
for dealing with racism in schools

education."

— including

the phrase itself, "urban

"Inner city," "ghetto," "slum," "target area," or "dis-

advantaged" schools all mean "black, poor schools."

For whites, the

matching euphemisms for their segregated schools have become "neighborhood schools," "protecting property values," "quality education," and

"safety in schools."

1.

The Persuasive Role of Leadership and Media

As the decade of the 1970's began, Northern white feelings about

integrated education were ambivalent.

In surveying those feelings, a

lot depended on how the question was phrased.

Northern whites were

often more positive on intent than on practical means to carry out
integration.

Gilbert Osofsky, The Making of a Ghetto (New York: Harper
The Making of a Negro
Torchbooks, 1966) and Allen Spear, Black Chicago
Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
1 See

:

.

.
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Clearly a maj or ity had favored an end to legal segregation
in the
South.

They deplored stories of violence in Pontiac, Michigan,
were

unopposed to decentralization in New York City, and approved
efforts
for providing minority children with better educational
opportunities.

They were heartened, by individual stories of interracial friendships.
In essence, they favored integration

— as

long as it was not in their

neighborhood or their children's schools.
Most saw their own individual role as less prejudiced than their

neighbors.

They personally liked the idea of at least token integra-

tion in schools.

Programs like METCO which bussed some ghetto children

to suburban schools were fine.

Voluntary transfer plans that might

*

bring more black children to previously all-white schools were also

acceptable
Most also preferred to maintain their neighborhood schools, but

were willing to accept small scale bussing or consolidation of schools
for some purpose besides racial balance.

They accepted the idea of

desegregated education in theory but resisted when the real difficulties of doing something became apparent.

They agreed that schools

should not be segregated, but were not willing to pay higher taxes or

change their neighborhood schools to do so.

Clearly most (68 percent in one survey) were opposed to bussing
for the sole purpose of racial balance.

^Newsweek, March 13, 1972,

p.

24.

2
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It made a great deal of difference how national leaders
phrased

the issues of integration

— whether

they appealed to people's hopes or

Many black parents as well resisted the idea of bussing for the

fears.

sole purpose of racial balance, without the prospect of improved education.

If the President or the Secretary of Health, Education and

Welfare stated that integrated schools were the only present proven
route to equality of education, that statement put the issue of bussing
in a far different light than if such leaders called for equality but

insisted on the sanctity of neighborhood schools.
The moral and mental confusion which surrounded the issue of

bussing was exemplified by the statements of Presidential candidate
"Scoop" Jackson in the spring of 1972.

having

a good

Senator Jackson, described as

record on civil rights, supported a Constitutional amend-

ment to outlaw bussing and guarantee the integrity of neighborhood
schools.

Without the larger framework of understanding institutional-

ized racism and inequality perpetuated by suburban exclusiveness, the

issue of bussing and desegregation of schools could not be approached

with any clarity.
The role that national media played in illuminating or distorting
the issues was as crucial as the role of national leaders.

When

television and newspaper accounts focused on violence and disruption
and ignored the many districts where schools integrated peacefully,

they reinforced the fears of both black and white parents.

Silberman pointed out in Crisis in

t

he Classroom

,

As Charles

American media had

the
yet to accept an educational role for the public by clarifying
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critical issues and by preparing the public for change
before such
changes descended.
In November, 1971, three national magazines ran articles
on

suburban exclusiveness and bitting.

The Serrano case in California

was challenging the. whole structure of local financing of schools,

while it was clear from statements from the national leadership that
the issues of integration and bussing were reaching a crisis point.

The

three articles formed three foci in a spectrum of clarity and forceful-

ness illuminating the issues of institutionalized racism and class dominance.

Their titles clued their places on the spectrum:

the most fair,

forceful, and enlightening article, from the New York Times Magazine

was entitled, "The Suburbs Have to Open Their Gates;" the more moderate,
but still basically strong article in Newsweek was called, "The Battle
of the Suburbs;" the ambivalent and misleading article from Time maga-

zine was appropriately called "The Agony of Bussing Moves North."

The Time article represented the subtle irresponsibility of

journalism which sought to write about issues of institutionalized racism

with appropriate "liberal enlightenment" while distorting the issues to
feed the basest fears of white middle Americans.

In short, the article

focused on the fears and weaknesses of white parents about losing their

hard-won suburban properties and exclusively white schools.
a

typical parent:

"I don't see any reason why they've got a right to

come in here and tell me my kids can't use the school

^"The Agony of Bussing Moves North," T ime
p.

57.

It quoted

,

I

bought and paid

November 15, 1971,

—
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The article told about one Boston suburban family
whose opposition
to integration was "not caused by bigotry" but
who felt helpless to com-

bat the threats of dangerous schools and streets, crime,
and lower

academic achievement.

The family selected who said "yes" to integra-

tion was the family. of the Governor of Virginia, who sent his
children
to integrated, city schools.

identify with

— the

It was obvious who most Americans would

honestly perplexed little man rather than the power-

ful public servant who could afford a little noblesse oblige.

unconvincing story was then told about

a

A rather

lawyer's family who cried

tears over sending their children to a less affluent school but sent

them anyway because "my husband feels very strongly about integration"

another example easy to write off as a masochism or madness.

To be

sure, at the end of the article, the reporter presented all the liberal

arguments for integration, but the arguments came too late, after the
damage was done.

Few Americans would take the word of scholarly

research or the Supreme Court's legal pronouncements over the words and
experiences of their well-intentioned neighbors.
Clearly, much of the source of educational inequality and racial

segregation in northern cities stemmed from suburban exclusiveness.
the N ewsweek article pointed out:

"Now, for the first time in history,

more Americans (a total of 76 million) live in the suburbs than in
either the great urban enclaves (which are home to 59 million) or in
the predominantly rural regions outside the metropolitan areas (total

population:

71 million)."

effects on the inner cities.

As

Population shift alone had disastrous
But the picture of a "white noose" of
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suburbia surrounding the central city and stealing its resources
became
blatant with the movement of industry to suburbs.
the housing remained closed to the workers:
it

is estimated that

The jobs moved, but

"In the New York suburbs,

150,000 of the 750,000 new jobs created during the

last decade were blue-collar jobs.

But the number of blue-collar

workers who found homes in the New York metropolitan area suburbs during
the same period increased by only 50,000.^

The Newsweek article went a long way in illuminating the inequality

created by the suburban residential monopoly.

But some of its force was

undercut by labeling those who were challenging that monopoly "open-

housing activists."

And, almost as if the earlier framework for

inequality had not been established, the article stated, "there is no
denying that even federally subsidized low-cost housing rarely 'pays
its way'

in suburbia."^

Of course low-income housing increased the

tax burden for schools and services, and higher population density

caused more problems.

But those facts remained a distortion of the

The suburban residents

truth without the other side of the picture.

who wished to preserve their middle-class sanctuaries derived their

economic life blood from the cities.

Responsible journalism should present both

a clear

understanding

of the causes of inequality and the hope of positive solutions.

The

New York Times article was the most helpful of the three by beginning

^"The Battle of the Suburbs," Newsweek, November 15, 1971,

p.

62.

November 15, 1971,

p.

64.

^"The Battle of the Suburbs," Newsweek

,
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clearly with the public responsibility for segregation and
inequality:
As the population, the taxable income and the jobs have
l^ft the cities for the suburbs, the 'urban crisis' of
substandard housing, declining levels of education and
public services, and dried-up employment opportunities has
been created. The crisis is not urban at all, but national,
and in part a product of the walls that have been built by
the suburbs to discourage outward movement by the poor and
blacks in the cities.

The article, unfortunately, did not elaborate on the shameful

partnership the federal government played in suburban inequality by subsidizing private housing through mortgage guarantees and tax deductions
for interest payments, by higher per pupil educational aid for suburban

districts than for urban districts, and by building highway systems to
suburbs which facilitated inexpensive commuting.

Further, federal and

city authorities destroyed housing for the urban poor.

While leveling

slums and constructing highways to the suburbs, urban renewal destroyed

more low- income housing than it replaced.

As both the Times and

Newsweek articles pointed out, not only were inner city residents prevented from moving to suburbs by restrictive zoning laws, but the jobs
that sustained them moved out to the suburbs, leaving them trapped in

decaying inner cities without jobs or adequate housing.
Suburbs were increasingly willing to admit industry into their

boundaries for tax support but were unwilling to allow the human task
forces for those industries the right to live where they worked.

In one

example cited, the Ford Motor Company purchased about 200 acres of land

^Linda Davidoff, Paul Davidoff, Neil Gold, "The Suburbs Have lo
Open Their Gates," The New York Times Magazine November 7, 1971, p. 40.
,

^
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in Mahwah, New Jersey, mid-vay between New
York City and Newark, for a

plant which emnloyed 4,200 workers.

Only

2

percent of the workers

lived in Mahwah, which was zoned for middle and
upper income homes.

The plant workers had to commute from New York or
Newark at considerable

expense.

The taxes paid by the company only benefited
Mahwah residents.

The New York Times article ended, if not on a note of
inspiring

hope, at least on a note which predicted the future and prepared
its

public for that future:

Non-profit groups and public agencies should also be preparing for the future by negotiating for tracts of suburban
land, on the theory that when the exclusionary laws are
struck down, they had better be ready with plans for construction of low and moderate-cost housing, or they will
risk leaving the whole ball game to the private developers.
Breaking the monopoly of the suburbs would undoubtedly be a difficult transition for some.

But the fears that the inner city and all its

blight would move wholesale to the suburbs were absurd.

The blight of

the inner city rested primarily on the fact of suburban separatism.

However difficult and "unfair” the transition to eaualitv and an open
society might be, the necessity was clear.

Irresponsible journalism,

like the Time magazine article, which muffled the necessity and played
up the fears and difficulties did a disservice to American democracy.

2.

—

Teaneck, New Jersey Case Study of
"Triumph in a White Suburb"

Bussing was clearly an expedient to combat racial isolation and
educational inequality.

7

Davidoff and Gold,

It was a temporary expedient.

P-

55.

On the one hand,
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bussing made little sense. .But more illogical was a society in which

minority populations were systematically ghettoized, oppressed, and provided inferior education.

Once the racial isolation in the schools was

broken, the most important motivation for residential isolation was
also broken.

Once the burden for quality schools was shared equally,

the blatant disparities between white and black schools began to dis-

appear.

Perhaps more important, by lifting from school children the

illusion that suburbs were a self-contained universe of white middle
class affluence, unconnected with the fate of the cities, those children

would become better prepared to participate in a future society freer
of racism and social inequality.

Whether a predominantly white community reacted to bussing and
integration with resistance and violence as in Pontiac, Michigan, or

with acceptance, even optimism, as in Berkeley, California, depended
great deal on the community and public leadership.
’

The case study of

Teaneck, New Jersey, described by Reginald G. Damerell in Triumph in

White Suburb,

g

is a

a

<z

crucial volume in the history of racial prejudice

in America.

Teaneck was the first northern suburb to integrate its schools
voluntarily.

As Mr. Damerell pointed out, Teaneck provided almost a

perfect "control community" for studying racial prejudice and public
leadership.

The children in Teaneck public schools from the black com-

munity numbered

a

mere 600 out of 8,200 students

seven percent.

^Reginald G. Damerell, Triumph in a White Suburb (New York:
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1968).
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Teaneck, the prejudice against blacks could not by any stretch of the

imagination have been explained on the basis of lower economic status,
lowered property values or lower achievement in schools:
no slums.

"Teaneck had

The members of the Negro community were of the same economic

level as the whites. whom they replaced.

Moreover, they were of a some-

what higher class with respect to its number of college degrees and

years of education."

The school with the highest black enrollment was

fourth in town wide achievement
schools.

— higher

"Had it not been for color

,

than three all-white elementary

the rest of the town would have

realized that this group in the northeast section, if anything, had

upgraded Teaneck."

9

The furor and bitterness raised by the integration

of Teaneck' s elementary schools, therefore, clearly stemmed from one

cause

— irrational,

unexamined prejudice.

Teaneck's successful integra-

tion revealed the importance of words, of leadership, and of creating a

dialogue that dealt with the real issues of white racism and the education of children.
In 1949, the U. S. Army selected Teaneck as a Model American Town
for post-war publicity in occupied Germany and Japan, praising it for
its "fine municipal spirit and the high quality of its governmental

services."

By the 1940's, nearby Englewood had a Negro ghetto reaching

to Teaneck's borders.

Recognizing a potential threat to their suburban

image, Teaneck town fathers hurriedly established a park area as a

buffer zone between the edge of Teaneck and Englewood ghetto.

9

Damerell, Triumph in a White Suburb

,

pp.

261-262.

By 1945,
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half a dozen black families lived just over the border
of Teaneck,

largely ignore by most Teaneck residents.
In 1954, after several black families had brought or
built fine

homes beyond the "buffer zone," panic selling hit the northeast
section.

Teaneck agents abandoned the area to out-of-town agents who saw an
opportunity for fat profits through block busting.

The v would call or

visit white home owners and tell them to sell now while they could,

spreading the fear of being the "last white on the block."

At this

crucial juncture, the long fight for racial equality began, significantly, on the issue of segregated housing.

A group of concerned,

white residents of the northeast section organized the Civic Conference
to fight the block-busting and to preserve an integrated neighborhood.

The whites on the committee were almost all Jewish, although the
area was predominantly gentile.
a

The early opening up of Teaneck to

Jewish minority had important future consequences for the integration

of Teaneck.

In a sense, the Jews acted as "bigot repellents."

As

Mr. Damerell hypothesized:

Anyone anti-semitic enough to move away from Jews is
The two prejudices are
almost invariably anti-Negro.
not identical but usually go together in the bigoted
personality. Had there been no Jews to repel these
Christians, they would have remained and fought against
school integration.-^

Teaneck was not without anti-semitism, however.

Resistance

towards more schools and increased taxes tied closely with enmity
towards Jews and feelings that schools were hot beds of Communism

10 Damerell,

pp.

80-81.
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(feelings fanned by McCarthy)

Progressive education and big spending

.

were associated with Jews.
In 1958

,

as a result of the sudden death of the mayor, Teaneck

found itself with a Jewish mayor

have predicted at that time.

— an

astonishing event no one would

After the 1960 School Board election,

there were four Jewish members on the nine-man board.

The remark was

heard in Teaneck, "The Jews are taking over."

Despite the efforts of the Civic Conference to keep the northeast
integrated, the area became increasingly segregated.

The Civic

Conference repeatedly urged the Town Council to establish

a

Human

Relations advisory board to deal with the problem of increasing segregation.

But the Council gave a characteristic response:

problem."

"There is no

Most whites in Teaneck in fact, right up to the time of

actually integrating the schools, simply refused to believe that
so-called ghetto existed in Teaneck.

Or,

a

if they believed it existed,

they had never seen it and firmly believed it must be shabby and run
down.
In 1961, the Teaneck School Board made a crucial choice in decid-

ing to hire a strong superintendent who cculd contend with the many

disgruntled factions in Teaneck.

They chose Harvey Scribner,

Superintendent of Dedham, Massachusetts schools,

a

native Mainer.

Shortly following Scribner's arrival, the school budget was defeated for
the first time on a wave of anti-semitism.

"Christians transferred
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their enmity against Negroes to Jews because the latter appeared
to be

fighting the Negroes’ battles." 11

Black enrollment in the Bryant Elementary School in the northeast
was up to more than thirty percent.

Black parents expressed their

concern that Bryant would become stigmatized as

would decline in prestige.

a

ghetto school and

White parents with children in Bryant became

increasingly afraid that the school's record was not good, although

it

in fact measured up in every way to other Teaneck schools.

In next door Englewood, racial tension was high over segregated

schools.

A lawsuit was in the courts, and people in Teaneck would say,

"We don’t want Englewood's troubles here"

— usually

meaning ignoring

segregation in the hopes that "it" would go away.

Harvey Scribner thought otherwise.
of segregation, his background

— working

Although new to the problems
class origins and a broken

home, working his way through college, and dealing with bigotry in

New England towns
he would face.

— prepared

him well for the human relations problems

Scribner believed the problems of racism and segrega-

tion had to be brought out into the open and dealt with.

His Board,

though receptive, was very reluctant to open this Pandora's box.

Nevertheless, Scribner convinced the Board to adopt as

a first

step an

open transfer policy to ease overcrowding and encourage lessening of

ghettoization.

The Board also went on record with a historic policy

statement of prevention:

^Damerell,

p.

150.

"The Teaneck Board of Education recognizes
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the future potential for racial imbalance in the William
Bryant and

Washington Irving Schools, and the Teaneck Board of Education favors
the initiation of a program prior to the existence of de facto
segrega-

tion to prevent racial imbalance in any of the schools. 12

Initial

reaction to the statement and the volunteer transfer plan was

unexpectedly mild.
The plan for voluntary transfer failed to change the picture of
racial imbalance.

Black parents were justifiably unwilling to place

the entire burden for integration on their children

— particularly

when the schools they were in were of high quality.

When Scribner met

with black parents in one crucial meeting, they expressed their anger
and impatience with such token measures.

Scribner spoke straight to

them and pledged a stronger second step when this one failed.

revealed in confidence his plan for ending racial imbalance:

He

making

the two schools, Bryant and Irving, central sixth and fifth grade

schools with the lower grades dispersed evenly among other elementary
schools.

The key factor, he understood, was timing.

In his first years of office, Scribner won respect from his

Board.

He tackled the touchy problem of religion in the schools right

away, convincing the Board to de-emphasize certain practices at

Christmas and to disallow such practices as collecting money in classes
for Christmas trees.

He went on to educate the Board by supplying a

steady stream of articles with information on the integration problems

12 Damerell, p.

166.
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of other communities.

He gave the- Board copies of James Baldwin's

The Fire Next Time.
The Board respected Scribner, but they also felt he was
pushing
too hard.

They asked his wife, "Can't you get him to slow down?"

But Scribner and his wife had discussed the situation at length
and

were prepared to stake his job on preventing segregation at the Bryant
School.

He got Board members to attend a private meeting with members

of the Negro community and asked those invited to state what they

would like on the agenda.

At the January, 1963, dinner meeting,

black citizens discussed the need for revised textbooks and unbiased
teacher attitudes

— especially

in guidance counselors.

Board members

expressed amazement at how professional and well-educated Teaneck
Blacks were.

The lack of insight of the Board was generally not out-

right bigotry but lack of exposure and experience.

Some Blacks pointed

out that if Teaneck became segregated, they would move out, and the

next Negroes who would come would be lower class.

strongly disagreed.

But other Blacks

It was an eye-opener for the Board to see that

they could no longer think in abstract stereotypes and generalize
about all Negro attitudes.

By spring of 1963 the Board said it was "studying several plans

submitted by the Board members

..

.who feel that steps should be taken

to prevent a recurrence of the Englewood situation."

13

The Board had

one black member, Lamar Jones, who was not clearly for integration and

was suspected of being an "Uncle Tom" in the black community, but who

13

Damerell,

p.

185.

.
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was nevertheless the first black
Board member in Teaneck.

By now

black enrollment at Bryant had reached
46 percent and 20 percent at
Irving.

The Board came up with essentially
an extension of the same

volunteer transfer plan.

Most on the Board congratulated
themselves

on a good solution, even though the plan
was in fact naive and

probably illegal, since it discriminated
against whites, not allowing
them the same transfer privileges.

Black parents, of course, equally

resented the second volunteer transfer plan.
think that my children are inferior.

children puts

I

One said, "I do not

think that to transfer Negro

heavy burden on young shoulders

a

In meetings with black parents, Scribner continued
to show his

ability to learn about the issues yet be himself.

At one point he was

accused by an angry parent of breaking a promise and he replied,
"I
will not sit here and permit you to categorize me with all other
whites.

You can tell me what my problems are, but don't classifv me

with every other white person who has ever mistreated vou."-^

Scribner's

directness built mutual trust and respect with Blacks and whites urging

integration in Teaneck.
By fall of 1963, public demands that the Board adopt a mandatory

integration plan became more insistent.

becoming stigmatized

— in

a

public meeting a white middle-class woman

referred to it as "a colored school."

^Damerell

,

p.

190.

15 Damerell,

p.

195.

Many felt Brvant was fast

The Board felt pressured into

.
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considering some plans.

The August March on Washington and the

Kennedy administration made morale high for integration.
The Board began considering essentially three
plans:

Con-

(1)

verting Bryant to a central sixth-grade school and
re-distributing
Bryant grades one to five through the other elementary
schools:
(2)

A modified Princeton Plan which would pair Bryant with Whittier

and Eugene Field with Washington Irving.

Two of the paired schools

would house grades one to three and the other two grades four to
six.
Four elementary schools would be left unintegrated:

(3)

Continue

voluntary enrollment, initiate an outside consultant study, and

meantime freeze enrollment at Bryant and Washington Irving so that
all new pupils would be assigned to other schools.

When Whittier parents learned that their school might be paired
with Bryant, they turned out in droves for

a P.T.A.

meeting.

Although

the difference between Whittier and Brvant in terms of relative

standing in Teaneck was negligible (and all Teaneck schools rated
above national averages)
of equating the schools.

,

parents got hysterical over the possibility
The Whittier Principal, a respected educator

in the system, had been quoted to sav,

do to it when they get here!"

"Can you imagine what they will

But at the public P.T.A. meeting in

December, the tide of the meeting turned.
out in full force.

The integrationists won the first skirmish of the

battle

16 Damerell,

p.

The liberals had also come
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At this point, a curious thing started to happen.

opposition" emerged on the scene.
in town activities before.

New York City surgeon.

The leaders had never taken part

All at once, on the issue of integration,

they came out of the woodwork.
a

Chief among them was Dr. Harry Warner,

He and his wife had been known as rather

apathetic about town and school issues.

They had lived there ten

years and spoke of Teaneck as a "hick town."
center of ferment.

A "new

Now, their home was the

They began to lead the opposition to integration,

arguing for neighborhood schools, lunch at home, no bussing
classic arguments.

— the

Ironically, Warner himself was Jewish.

In spring of 1964, the opposition forces moved into action.

Warner had decided to run for the school board.

He and his wife took

off strong and clear on an anti-bussing campaign.

they were not against integration, but were against

Their cry was that
7

bussing.'*''

In

the February election, the budget was again defeated, and Warner and

Margolis, two of the three candidates against bussing, won positions
on the school board.

It was clear that the voters were voting for

segregation, whether out of prejudice or ignorance or both.

A month before the election, Scribner had presented the Board

with his plan for a centralized fifth and sixth grade.

This alterna-

tive still placed most of the burden for bussing on the Bryant and

Irving parents, but it avoided leaving some schools unintegrated which
the pairing would do.

The Board was badly divided on how to proceed

"^Similarly in the March, 1972 Newsweek poll cited earlier, 66
percent of white Americans agreed that schools should be desegregated,
while 69 percent opposed bussing.
,

40
on integration, but Warner and Margolis viewed
the other seven members
as a solid conspiracy to foist bussing on Teaneck.

The Board members realized they would have to act now,
before

another School Board election might bring in more anti-integration
forces.

The town was becoming increasingly polarized.

Most kept

their prejudice veiled behind rhetoric for "the will of the majority"
and the integrity of neighborhood schools.

Warner and his supporters

held secret cottage meetings and screened those allowed to attend.
One strategy was for Warner to leave early.

Then others would con-

duct a discussion in which privileged information of Warner's office

would be revealed.

In May of 1964, the Neighborhood School Association

was formed out of the anti-integration forces.
On May 11, the Board met in executive session to adopt an integra-

tion plan to present to the public at the May 13 public Board meeting.

Simultaneously, members of NSA were meeting with the Town Council

members to convince them to tell the School Board not to act because
of impending "violence" and public protest.

NSA had a Negro woman

as vice-president who assured the Council that the black community

was against bussing and the plan to make
But the Board had reached agreement.

central sixth grade school.

a

Bryant would become an all sixth

grade school and Bryant children from the first five grades would be

bussed to other elementary schools (excluding Irving)

.

Enrollment

in Irving would be frozen after re-zoning the district to include 79

more white children.

After the vote had been taken, several of the

Town Councilmen rushed in breathlessly in

a

state of near panic.
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But more moderate councilmen arrived
shortly thereafter.

Mayor Feldman

simply said, "Gentlemen, this is your
decision to make," and left.
The Warner forces were getting ready for the
May 13 public
Board meeting.

That morning NSA ran anti-bussing ads
saying "Help

Preserve Your Neighborhood Schools."

That evening, an almost totally

new audience was at the public Board meeting

— faces

by many Board members— faces mostly hostile.

never seen before

The chairman sensed a

crisis situation and directed Board members to keep to
a low tone
and avoid emotionality.

When the motion was raised for the sixth

grade school, it was met by boos and catcalls.

Warner and Margolis

moved to table the motion and were voted down.

When Harvey Scribner

took the microphone, he met with derogatory cracks and clenched
fists.
But the chairman was able to keep tempers cooled.

After a final

confirming vote of the motion, taken in dead silence, the audience
erupted in screaming and shouting.
they would be attacked.

But the audience staved in control and

cries went up for "Recall! Recall!"

sixth grade school with bussing
no furor at all

— no

The Board seriouslv wondered if

—a

All this, over centralizing a

move which in other towns caused

furor when the issue did not involve black children.

Hate literature began to flow into Teaneck, mostly from extremist organizations in the South, reading "Integration, Denegration,

Mongrelization.

"

Most of it was anti-semitic as well as anti-Negro.

The messages were too blatant and did not have much influence in
Teaneck.

The NSA offended some previously neutral people when they

picketed the National Democratic Convention with pretests against
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what was happening in Teaneck.

Even some of their supporters resented

having the town’s dirty linen hung in national view.

When school opened in September, about sixty-four couples had
threatened to boycott the sixth grade school.

The Town Council sent

them letters urging them to keep the law and to use their vote to

express their discontent.

There were no boycotts.

All the schools opened without incident.
But that night at a public Board meeting,

vitriolic verbal attacks were high.
tinued

— basically

Nevertheless, the voting con-

seven to two on all issues.

At this point, the

Warner campaign began to take on new rhetoric, the "Communist conspiracy" tack.

This approach helped members of NSA to attack people

with long and honorable records
Board members

— as

—Mayor

unknowing dupes of the larger conspiracy.

speeches began to get more extreme.
Marx.

Feldman, Scribner, and other

Warner's

He equated John Dewey and Karl

Opponents began to call the Warner forces "Know Nothings" and

laugh at their rhetoric.
sixth grade school.
first step

— could

Most parents were satisfied with the new

But the crucial test to see if integration

— it's

hold would be the school board election of February,

1965.

The pro-integrat ion Teaneck Political Assembly reluctantly decided

they had to run a new slate to oppose Warner, Margolis and their
candidates.

The old slate was too closely associated with the May 13

decision for integration.

They also believed they could only win by

getting the vote out in record numbers.

One group of liberals felt,

like Scribner, that the integration issue had to be met head on

— there
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was no way to win by simply, talking about quality education
at the
sixth grade central school.

Eventually, the Teaneck Political Assembly

became convinced to have their three candidates run openly on
the platform that segregated education was inferior education--for all.

From January

4

for the next five weeks, Teaneck was immersed

in local election campaigning.

professional campaign.

The integration forces ran a top-notch

Canvassers were taught how to identify poten-

tial plus voters and not waste time arguing with negative voters.

Three cottage parties were scheduled each night.

Candidate forums

were to be held in the high school with all candidates speaking.
At the first of these forums, the NSA candidates came across

badly.

They were so clearly negative, with no positive platform.

When asked questions about the moral and legal aspects of segregation,
they stumbled.

At one point, one candidate who was getting embar-

rassed and frustrated blurted out, "You have branded your people as
18

inferior

.

prejudice.

We have not."

The audience was shocked at such blatant

The negativism, the evasion, and the extremism of Communist

conspiracy rhetoric began to boomerang on the NSA.

But still, the

challenge to win the election was to get the vote out, since many of
the opposition were hidden and could not be engaged or confronted.
Dr. Scribner saw close parallels between Dr. Warner's campaign

and the goals of the John Birch Society.

same threats and pressures in Dedham.

18 Damerell, p.

309.

He had faced some of the

In a last ditch attempt, Warner
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and Margolis obtained illegally a school administration
tape of a

conference Scribner had attended.

They felt the tapes proved that

Scribner had premeditated to "subvert the will of the majority."

They

had the tapes made into plastic records and mailed out en masse
the day

before the election.

The Scribner forces could have obtained a court

order to stop the mailing of the records, but they saw the records as

essentially harmless

— few

reading into them.

Scribner quipped at a public meeting, "I am the

people would read into them what Warner was

only superintendent who has a record about to come on the market."^
On election day, February 9, 1965, the "Good Guys" won all three

contested seats on the School Board.

In each case they won by about

7,000 to 5,000 votes, a record turnout for Teaneck.

"The victory, it

is important to remember, was for an integration plan in operation

.

Had the sixth-grade plan not been in effect but only proposed for the

coming year, chances are that Kaplan, Sampson and Foah would have won
as Warner and Margolis had the year before."

20

As the case study of Teaneck clearly pointed out, the key to the

narrow victory of the integration advocates rested on positive leadership and on bringing the issues clearly before the public.

The emotional

issue of integration aroused an opposition that avoided coming out in the

open and that operated on people’s private fears and prejudices.

It

could only be overcome by calm, straight-forward leadership which

appealed to people's common sense and higher motives.

^Damerell,

p.

326.

^°Damerell, p. 336.

"That it should
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have been so difficult to achieve, where Negroes and
whites were so

evenly matched, throws a great deal of light on the
difficulties of

communities where actual disparity does exist.
The key to eventually breaking down de facto segregation in
schools
is bringing an end .to residential segregation.

"But superintendents

of schools and boards of education cannot wait for integrated housing.

They must risk unpopularity by integrating their schools knowing that
most whites, although hostile at first, are soon convinced by the
fait accompli because it is usually in keeping with their consciences."””

President Eisenhower stated that laws cannot change men's hearts.

But

the story of Teaneck and the history of civil rights in America prove

otherwise.

Laws can change men's actions; and through changed actions,

prejudice and institutionalized racism can abate.

Bussing is an incon-

venient means, but clearly a necessary one to end racial separation in

schools

3.

Berkeley, California

—A

City Integrates Its Schools

Segregated schools, whether de facto in the North or de jure in
the South, convey to their students a lack of mutual respect and trust

between black and white Americans.

By their existence, segregated and

tracked schools are powerful teachers of bigotry, perpetuating racial

ignorance and misunderstandings.

21-Damerell

,

p.

350.

^Damerell,

p.

351.

Because such segregation has meant

,
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inequality, integration has become a pragmatic strategy for
Blacks to

assure equal and quality education.

Studies of newly-desegregated institutions and communities
show
that,

in spite of

initial

-w antagonisms, only through

integrated situations do racial fears, misunderstandings, and hatreds
diminish. 23

As the storv of Teaneck, New Jersey, demonstrated, even

without class disparities between races, integration was resisted.

In

most areas of the country, however, poverty and racism are institu-

tionally linked.

Meaningful integration implies not onlv racism but

class integration.
In American small towns and medium-sized cities, North and

South, the trend is towards at least token desegregation.

In response

to protests or legal pressures or through strong leadership, some

districts have ended blatant separation in schools.
huge metropolitan areas

— New

However, in

York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta

trend is toward increased segregated educational facilities.

— the

2
4A

By the end of the 1960's, the earlier hone that integration would

bring eauality had largelv dwindled.

pragmatic

— schools

Part of the disillusionment was

could not single-handedly counteract major trends

toward ghettoization.

Part of the disillusionment was recognition

of the ingenuity of the white maioritv in perpetuating racial

Pettigrew, "Racially Separate or Together," Journal

23 Thomas F.

of Social Issues

^Raymond

,

Vol.

25, No.

1,

1969, pp

.

W. Mack, Our Children's Burden

tion in Nine American Communities (New York:
p.

446.

43-69.
:

Studies of Desegrega Random House, 1°68)
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separation under the guise of integration.

Tracking systems often

kept black and minority students isolated within newly
integrated

schools.

Black parents and children usually found the inconvenience

and burden of bussing placed on their shoulders while white
children

remained comfortably ensconced in tbeir middle class neighborhood
schools
Aware of the shallow altruism that integration often stood for,

many black and minority spokesmen turned from activism for integration to activism for Black Power and community control.

The often

voiced feeling was, "Leave us alone; just let us run our own
schools."

Nevertheless, for small cities such as Springfield,

Massachusetts; White Plains, New York; or Louisville, Kentucky such
political cynicism or social despair was premature.

gration was still

a

Meaningful inte-

foreseeable solution to uneaual educational opdot-

tunities in many parts of America.
In September, 1968, a auiet revolution in school integration

took place in Berkelev, California.

Berkeley was the first city of

its size (population 120,000) with a significant black school enroll-

ment, about forty percent, to achieve integration in all its elementary

classrooms.

Across the bav from San Francisco, Berkelev had a substan-

tial university community, black and minority community, and hosted

groups as diverse as the Black Panthers and the John Birch Society.
In recent decades, Berkeley's residential patterns divided

predictably into de facto segregation.

Whites occupied newer, more

expensive houses on the "hill" and Blacks lived in older, more crowded
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houses on the "flats."
into place.

The- other pieces of the familiar pattern
fell

Housing discrimination resulted in de facto segregation

in neighborhood schools and increasing disparities in
facilities,

reputation, and educational achievement between hill and flats
schools.
In 1964, Neil Sullivan came to Berkeley as Superintendent from
the Freedom Schools in Prince Edward Countv, Virginia.

After his

experience in Civil Rights, he felt uncomfortable about returning to

administration in an affluent Long Island suburb.

He saw in Berkeley

an opportunity to carry on the fight for equalitv of opportunitv and

quality education through total integration of school-aged children. 25
Three years earlier Berkeley had elected a majority of liberal

members to its School Board, including its first black member.

The

Berkeley High School was physically integrated by virtue of being the
only high school.

However, tracking based on traditional achievement

tests succeeded in keeping the high school internallv segregated to a
large extent.

In 1964, the Board moved to desegregate the two dis-

trict junior high schools by designating them twelve and thirteen

year-old central schools and by building a new all -ninth grade school,
West Campus.

The situation was rough during Sullivan's first year.

dents themselves were tense and uncomfortable.

The stu-

In a bitter dispute,

the Parents' Association and The Berkeley Gazette tried to impeach the

25

For an autobiographical account of the integration of Berkeley
under Neil Sullivan's leadership, see: Neil V. Sullivan and Evelyn S.
I ntegration In The Berkeley Schools
Stewart Now Is The Time
(Rloomington Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1969).
:

,

,
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Board.

But the impeachment- failed to get public support
and the

atmosphere in the schools improved.

While the majority of the white

population felt satisfied with the speed and extent to which
schools
had integrated, increasing complaints from Blacks convinced
Sullivan
and the Board,

in the Fall of 1966, that the time had come to chal-

lenge segregation in elementary schools.

Sullivan believed that integration had to be achieved at once
because, first, it was the law of the land and, second, it was

moraHy

right.

crossed

He had faith that the most difficult hurdles had been

the high school and junior high schools were phvsically

integrated.

Students there were growing in racial respect and

understanding.

He knew from his experience that young children in

the earlier grades make no color distinctions.

Ironically, it was

this age group and the issue of bussing that aroused the greatest

opposition.

Parents echoed typical national cries of the integrity

of neighborhood schools and the costs and dangers of bussing.

In February, 1966, the Board began its campaign on a small

scale with federal support by bussing 238 black children from the

overcrowded "flats" schools to the so-called better "hill" schools.

Extensive parent meetings both in white and black communities preceded the bussing and prepared for its initiation.

Sullivan realized

the pain and burden small-scale bussing put on the black parents and

children.

He also feared the hypocrisy of such a token plan.

Neverthe-

less, he and the Board hoped that pilot success would allay public
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fears and that the staff would gain necessary experience
for system-

wide bussing.
The pilot bussing succeeded, but 1966 brought escalation
in

racial tension.

In September, after the outbreak of violence
across

the bay in Hunter's Point, San Francisco, unrest and fighting
took

place in Berkeley High School and the West Campus.
focused their anger on tracking and racism.

Black students

Sullivan and the Board

pledged to end tracking in Berkeley Schools by 1970.

But the con-

troversial subject of tracking could have jeopardized the desegregation campaign for the elementary schools.

Sullivan and the Board

were caught between the urgency of the need for change and the
danger of moving too fast on too many fronts.
By the April 18, 1967 Board meeting, the public pressure of

those who attended, the support of teacher organizations, and the

need for immediate integration all produced a clear mandate.

The

Board adopted the resolution to integrate Berkeley's elementary schools
by September, 1968.

This resolution was followed by vigorous discus-

sion at dozens of meetings, heated opposition and support, and the

consideration of fifty different plans.
plan for bussing.

What emerged was a simple

Rather than expediently increasing percentages of

black children in a few schools

—a

compromise which had repeatedly

failed in other cities--the Board pledged to enroll the same racial

proportions in every school.
Two years later, Berkeley schools were integrated.

The corner-

stone of the plan, its basis for legitimacy, was heterogeneous
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classrooms.

Although some curricular subjects had "performance"

groups, children were not tracked by achievement or
1.0. tests.

bright kids

were not hindered by the grouping.

The

According to a

recently published study, SAT scores showed "that white,
black and

Asian students made better progress before desegregation."
of integrated classes to all children were tremendous.

teacher put it:

I

The benefits

As one white

think if we'd done this ten or fifteen years ago,

many of our racial problems would be solved now.
accepting of each other, with no racism that

I

The children are so

can see."

2^

Fears that whites would flee to the suburbs were unfounded.

Teacher turnover did not increase.
of the total school budget.

Bussing cost less than one percent

There were no significant discipline

problems with racial overtones in the elementary schools.
tion changed some attitudes.

And integra-

Before bussing started, 52 percent of

the white community opposed the idea, and after two years onlv about
30 percent were still opposed.

27

Most important, a growing consensus

of people, both black and white, had lost some fears and prejudices

through interaction and were ready to support school integration.
Neil Sullivan's leadership swung the balance towards integration.
He believed in it and projected a personal conviction that gained

respect from black and white parents.

He had confidence that people's

by the Center for Urban Education, New York, reviewed
in Saturday Review June 19, 1971, p. 52.
Gertrude Samuels, "How School Bussing Works in One Town," New
York Times, September 27, 1970, p. 52.
2 6Report

,

27

'Samuels, p. 60.
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attitudes could change, and. he facilitated those
changes through

hundreds of public meetings.

He fought for system-wide bussing,

heterogeneous classes, and the end of tracking when he
could have
settled for token integration and stop-gap measures.

Above all, he

had faith that young children are free of racial prejudice and
that

parents can learn from their children.

His and Berkeley’s success

revealed the hypocrisy of white America's protest, "Not here; not
now!

"

The key to successful integration in both Berkeley, California,
and Teaneck, New Jersey, was the strong leadership of black and

white parents, the willingness of the school boards to deal directly

with the issues, and the roles of superintendents Sullivan and
Scribner.

In both situations, the issues were laid directly before

the public and discussed in hundreds of public meetings.

Through

that process, tokfen desegregation plans were eventually replaced

with plans that placed the burden of integration on the entire community.

Once the initial furor was faced openly and forcefully, par-

ents became convinced that integration could work without sacrificing

quality education.
The stories of Teaneck and Berkeley were being repeated throughout the country.

Under federal court order, Pasadena, California

schools became integrated as of Fall, 1970.
ing with minimal opposition and problems.

It too seems to be work-

A recent television docu-

mentary on Pontiac, Michigan, showed how tensions have eased and most
significantly

— how

easily the children have accepted the fait accompli

of integrated schools and classrooms.

53

Predominantly white suburbs have made some small
strides towards
increased racial awareness by bussing across district
and city lines.
In the METCO Program in Boston, similar to Project
Concern in Hartford,

students from Roxbury and other ghettos travel each day to
white

suburban high schoo.ls.

Similarly, black children from New Haven,

Connecticut, are bussed to suburban North Haven.

Only a small pro-

portion of students is involved, and the commuting burden borne by

black students is great.

Nevertheless, such programs represent one

tiny step toward racial awareness in suburban areas.

At the very

least, these examples demonstrate that despite immediate limitations

upon meaningful integration, no district has to teach discrimination
by its actions.

Through exchange programs, by including minority

culture and history in the curriculum, and by recruiting minority
personnel, even the most isolated white schools can demonstrate awareness of the reality of serving a multi-racial society.

The present political rhetoric against bussing for integration
is disheartening.

President Nixon has pledged:

not leave the situation as it is."

"We cannot and will

Calling for a period of "benign

neglect" in racial issues and turning back the clock for integration
denies the American public credit for the significant gains that
have been made.

As Thomas Pettigrew's studies predicted, after

initial negative reactions to integration, prejudice and misunderstanding ebbed as personal interaction increased.

The American people

have grown in their understanding of the legal and moral mandates
for integration.

ently has not.

The tragedy is that the American leadership appar-

CHAPTER
WHERE CHILDREN LEARN:

III

SUCCESS WITHIN THE SYSTEM

Experimental urban schools have risen into the limelight and
faded quietly or closed with loud protests.

Dedicated people have

entered the fray, scored extraordinary successes and retreated in

exhaustion or moved to higher level jobs.

A sixth grade teacher in

Chicago after four years of hard planning raised the average achievement levels of her students above national norms, only to have a new

principal reprimand her, "As long as you teach, you remember your
children are Negroes first and students second."

The First Street

School in Manhattan changed the lives of a small group of children,
but the founders realized in all honesty that they could not repeat
that energetic output for a third year without major funding.^

Perhaps

it

matters little that some experiments are so short-

lived or that the innovators come and go.

The important fact is

that quality education can and does happen.

The significance of

the single success far outweighs the history of multiple failures.

The self-fulfilling prophecy which has doomed urban schools to

repeated failure can be reversed so that success may feed upon itself.

Studies of Desegrega^Raymond W. Mack, Our Children s Burden
House, 1968),
Random
York:
Communities
(New
tion in Nine Am erican
George Dennison,
see
School,
Street
For information on First
p. 382.
in its Rela Freedom
Lives of Children: A Practical Description of
The Story of the First Street School
tion to ~Growth and Learning
Random House, 1969).
(New York:
1

:

:

—
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A school which proves it can be done provides the
essential ingredient
of the American dream

— the

Quality education is

hope factor.
a fact

in some urban schools.

Integrated

classrooms, unbiased teachers, positive leadership, and community

support can halt

at.

once the tragic turn-off of talent in inner

city elementary schools.

In high schools, where the purposes and

means of education are far less clear, where students are older and
the interaction with a larger society presents difficult pressures
and unanswered questions, a statement of needs and new directions is

more complex.

Still, there are promising solutions which offer models

for the future.

Proved successes raise a new question:

how is it done?

not can it be done, but

There is no simple answer to how change comes about.

The schools, programs, and projects described in this dissertation
have all made small but significant changes in urban education.

The

— preschool, elementary, secondary, adult
strategies — public and private, self-contained

examples cover all ages
and many different

system wide, structural, physical, spiritual, or political.
changes have been short lived.

and

Some

Some model schools and programs are

firmly entrenched; others fight for daily existence.

Some seem to

rest entirely on the talents of one leader; others reflect a community
of shared responsibility and concern.

The people who created these institutions had in common the

determination to provide equal educational opportunity for poor and

minority American children.

By unshakable optimism, tolerance for
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uncertainty, affection for fellow beings, educational
vision and
creativity, political guile and guts, they succeeded.

example mentioned, dozens of others could be cited.

For each
For prospective

teachers these representative stories provide the often
neglected

vision of exciting opportunities to teach, to grow, and to
bring
about change in urban schools.
Some of the most dramatic success stories in urban education

concern schools within the system with ordinary resources and a
regular staff.

In the elementary schools of American cities, where

most of the damage turning off and dropping out poor and minority

children is done, but where the incredible resiliency of children
never quite gets crushed, the way to reform seems crystal clear.

As

Kenneth Clark has maintained, and as the preliminary research on
Sesame Street revealed, so-called disadvantaged children will learn

when they are taught.

A variety of methods and texts are available

that teach reading, writing, and numbers without destroying the fun
of learning

— if

teachers care and believe their children can succeed.

Young children quickly respond to adults who care.
adapt to integrated classrooms of heterogeneous grouping.

They easily
They are

eager and ready to learn from teachers who are willing to teach.

What is essential is the positive attitude exemplified by Matthew

Schwartz, Principal of P.S. 146 in East Harlem:

"I don't want to

hear any talk about apathetic parents or hungry children or sleepy

:

.

57

children or anything else.

We have enough riches to overcome such

handicaps, and we are accountable if these
children fail." 2

The Right to Read

1.
%
j

Vr-> *

v

>

Probably every urban school system contains at least
one
elementary school where poor and minority children are
contradicting
the myth of disadvantaged children by achieving above
national achieve-

ment norms.

Charles Silberman’s Crisis in the Classroom documented

three elementary schools in New York City’s Harlem which were
clearly

succeeding at the business of educating children.

The principals

and staff of those schools operated within the same contraints as

most inner city schools in New York.

Although one was

a

MES (More

Effective Schools) school with some additional resources, money alone
could not account for the unusual level of success.

The positive

leadership of the principals, an atmosphere of warmth and support,
and teachers who were inspired to seek and achieve success made the

difference
A recent study of reading programs in four inner city elementary

schools provides a valuable documentation of success.

George Weber,

Associate Director of the Council for Basic Education in
Washington,

D.

C., conducted a study in 1970-1971 based on three

facts

Charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New York:
House, 1970), pp 105-106.
.

Random

.
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1.
Reading achievement in inner city schools is both relatively and absolutely low.
2.
Laymen and school people believe that such low results
are all you can expect

3.

Ther

are

It was, of course, the third fact which motivated Weber to

study successful reading programs and summarize his conclusions in:

"Inner-City Children Can Be Taught To Read:
Schools."

3

Four Successful

He set as his criteria finding inner-city schools (non-

selective public schools in the central part of

a large city

which

were attended by very poor children) where children were achieving
in reading substantially above national norms and where the percentage
of gross reading failures was low.

After an extensive search, he

found four schools in three different cities:

P.S. 11 and John H.

Finley (P.S. 129) in Manhattan; the Woodland School in Kansas City,
Missouri; and the Ann Street School in Los Angeles, California.
The third grade level was chosen to study in depth.

Third grade

is the point at which beginning reading instruction normally ends and

at which the achievement gap between poor, minority children and

white middle-class children begins to appear.

A reading achievement

test was specially created for the study which correlated with

national achievement tests.

The test used focused on children's

"mechanical" ability to read simple American English

— unfamiliar

words were eliminated and non-English speaking children were not

^George Weber, "Inner-City Children Can Be Taught To Read:
Four Successful Schools." Washington, D. C. Council for Basic
Education, Occasional Papers Number Eighteen, 1971.
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tested.

In each school studied, reading achievement levels
were

approximately those of typical average-income schools; 42 to
46 percent of the third graders scored fourth grade or higher on
a national

norm basis.
P.S. 11 in Manhattan is a MES school

— it

has a lower pupil-

teacher ratio of 22:1, has supplementary "cluster teachers," and has

more supervisory and auxiliary personnel, plus

a

pre-kindergarten.

If being an MES school were the key, however, all MES schools would

be doing better

Puerto Rican,

— and

17

most are not.

One half of the students are

percent are Black, almost all are very poor.

Principal, Mr. Goldberg, "runs a tight ship."

— teachers have a wide range to
heterogeneous — there is a conscious effort

The

There is no single

reading program

choose from.

are

to mix children from

Spanish-speaking homes with others.

Classes

Every classroom has a library,

and children can take books home for a week at a time.

"High

expectations and concern for every pupil are reflected in many
things, including the atmosphere of individualization.

Most of all,

there is an obvious emphasis on early reading achievement and the

importance given to phonics instruction."

4

The John H. Finley School in Manhattan (P.S. 129

— one

of the

three schools described in Silberman's book) is affiliated with City

College as

a

demonstration school.

Seventy percent of the students

are black; thirty percent are from Spanish-speaking homes; all

^Weber, p. 15.

.

.
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qualify for free lunch.

The Principal, Mrs. Froelich, is "a

no-nonsense leader who is also friendly and kind” and
always seems
accessible to teachers and parents.

Finley has had a uniform, highly

structured reading program since 1962:
!•

All children start out heterogeneous in the first half

of first grade.
2.

Individualization (grouping) begins in the second half

of first grade.
3.
Careful and frequent evaluation is done by someone outside the classroom.
4.

A very large variety and quantity of materials are

used

—

5.
Phonics implicity and explicity
first two grades.

— is

taught in the

"This planned, precise reading program benefits from a general school

atmosphere that includes high expectations,

a

concern for every child,

and considerable home involvement through homework and school-home

communications

Woodland School in Kansas City, Missouri, is an old school,
built in 1921, in which 99 percent of the children are black and
almost all are very poor.
a

The school is part of "Project Uplift,"

program designed by Robert Wheeler,

for the Division of Urban Education.

the myth of failure:

-*Weber,

pp

.

16-18.

a

black area-superintendent

Mr. Wheeler's words challenged

—

a
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We began with the fundamental belief that inner-city
pupils can learn as well as other pupils, provided
the
priorities are sensible, the effort intense, and the
instructional approaches rational in terms of the needs
of the learners.
We have not accepted the myth that
environmental factors develop unalterable learning
depression. We believe that so-called negative environmental factors can be overcome with sensitive and responsive teaching.
"Project Uplift" began in Fall, 1968.

Reading and speech specialists

were provided for each of the eleven schools involved, plus teacher
aides.

The Sullivan Programmed Reading Series was adopted so that

children could proceed at their own pace.

In-service training

programs focused on raising staff expectations about pupil potential.
The most important factors for success in beginning reading at

Woodland:

high expectations, the use of the Mc-Graw Hill Sullivan

Program, the considerable time devoted to reading, with the reading
and speech specialists plus the teacher aides rounding out the pic-

ture

.

At the Ann Street School in Los Angeles, all the children
62 percent Mexican-Amer ican and 38 percent Black

housing project.

— live

in a nearby

The Principal of four years, Mrs. Zikas, first

established order and level of discipline and then turned to

revitalizing the curriculum.

The elementary program is ungraded

child may take three or four years to complete it.

—

One half of the

children come to school from 9:00 to 2:00; the other half come from
10:00 to 3:00.

In the two hours when only half the class are

^Weber, p. 19.
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present, intensive reading -instruction takes place.

ferences have replaced report cards.

reading approach is used.

Parent con-

The Mc-Graw Hill Sullivan

There is a very active student govern-

ment, and the school tests the children frequently.

Weber summarized what he saw as success factors common to
sll four schools (and usually not present in unsuccessful inner-city

schools)

:

strong leadership (in three cases, a principal; in one
case the area superintendent)

—
—
—
—
—
—
—

high expectations
good atmosphere

strong emphasis on reading

additional reading personnel
use of phonics

individualization
careful evaluation of pupil progress.

He also noted what factors did not seem to be essential:

—
—
—
—
—
—

small class size

achievement grouping
quality of teaching staff
ethnic background of principals and teachers

preschool education
physical facilities.

In a sense, his conclusions correspond with those of James Coleman,

with one crucial difference

— the

schools he studied did not have to
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be integrated (racially or economically) for
success to take place.

Change did not come overnight.
for three to nine years.

Each program had been established

The success of the four schools studied

shows "that the failure in beginning reading typical of
inner-city
school is the fault not of the children or their background

— but

of

the schools.

District 12 in the Bronx

2.

— Blueprint

for Change

The stories of individual elementary schools that have succeeded
are in themselves proof that urban education can be turned around.

Even more convincing is recent evidence that an entire inner city
district has succeeded in upgrading achievement dramatically in its

elementary and intermediate schools.

The district that has proven

that success can happen is District 12 in the Bronx; and the primary

force behind that success is Edythe Gaines, Superintendent from 1967
to 1970.

Dr. Gaines is a dynamic,

intelligent black woman who has

"a reputation for getting things done."

Reginald Damerell, as research for

a

In an interview with

book he is writing on Chancellor

Scribner, Dr. Gaines described her role in bringing about change in
O

District 12.

District 12 is the second poorest district in the Bronx.

With

over 42,000 students, it has the most overcrowded schools in the city.

^Weber

,

pp

.

25-30.

®The quotations and material for this section were taken from
tapes of Mr. Damerell' s interview with Dr. Gaines. The author of this
dissertation is indebted to Mr. Damerell for making those tapes available for this research.
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When Dr. Gaines arrived, 15,000 children were not
receiving
school day of instruction.

Most of the children are very

are minorities, and over 50 percent are Puerto Rican.

a full

poor—most

The community

in 1967 was in a rapid state of transition and very hard
to organize

One black neighborhood had been there for many years; but other

areas were rapidly changing.

In old Jewish neighborhoods, as people

died or moved to the suburbs, young families with many children came

largely Puerto Rican

mobility.

who were seeking better schools and upward

Those aspirations provided the organizing force for

Dr. Gaines’

leadership.

She began to win her reputation for getting things done by

finding space

— the

mobile units provided by the school system were

depressing and inadequate.
places

—a

She created classrooms in unlikely

rooming house, an abandoned factory.

A mattress factory

was carpeted and transformed into a school with open classrooms.

Reading was what people were concerned about, so that was what
she chose to focus on.

"But it almost didn’t matter what we chose.

Out aims were made clear from the beginning:

—
—
—
—

to change the nature of elementary school education
to change the roles of teachers
to change the atmosphere in the schools
to change what we mean by schools

and in the final end, to destroy the egg-crate classrooms."

t
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When Edythe Gaines arrived in District 12, the
schools that had
been basically strong were weakened by the sheer
numbers of new
children.

District 12 had existed for only two years, thrown

together from other districts, and she was its fourth
Superintendent
in two years.

She -set out immediately to bring change through

achieving success in elementary reading.
The teachers were involved from the start.

who welcomes change.

If

I

want you to change,

that what you want to get done
Dr

.

I

"There is no one
I

must convince you

can help you get done better."

Gainers was convinced no one was more dismayed at their failures

than the teachers.

Secondly, she recognized their limitations.

She

believes that to assume simply because someone speaks the language

well and has

a B.A.

makes no sense.

they are an expert linguist and can teach reading

"I say to the teachers, I will put at your disposal

someone who has learned to teach the language and who will put
a

way that cannot fail, and then you can perform like

in

it

genius."

a

She introduced into all the schools linguistic methods to teach

reading.

Language is broken into component parts that

grasp and build upon.
his intelligence.

a

child can

A child can learn piece by piece and can trust

ITA (Initial Teaching Alphabet) uses an expanded

alphabet in which each letter has only one sound.

After the child

learns reading with ITA and feels confident he can master the skill,
the transition is made to standard

—more

inconsistent

— English.

The

Sullivan "Project Read" and Programmed Instruction introduce the
standard alphabet, but introduces only the logical, consistent sounds
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A child learns "fat" before he is faced with the silent

first.
e

in

fate.

The method developed by Caleb Gattegno uses words

that are color coded and a lively participatory process for approaching beginning reading.

Each program adopted was simple enough for the average teacher
to use.

It was finally possible to really individualize reading

instruction

— "the

not to happen."

systems we introduced made it impossible for it

Teachers found they could manage more easily than

before and now were getting success.

When Edythe Gaines arrived in the district, 86 percent of the
children were reading far below grade level.

In her first year,

the Teachers’ Strike disrupted the implementation of the new reading

programs.

By 1970, after essentially only two years, District 12

had made a dramatic rise in achievement:

children--K through

9

— were

over 50 percent of the

reading "very close to the national norm.

That increase is even more dramatic when viewed in the context of

other New York inner city schools where reading achievement continues
to go down.

The hard data on achievement in schools is difficult to unearth.

The New York Office of Research and Statistics could not provide

statistics from year to year derived from the same data base.

In

fact, the only way Edythe Gaines discovered some data that supported

her perceptions of what was happening in District 12 was when she

investigated why District 12 had

a

seemingly low budget for

needs" since it was second poorest in the Bronx.

special

She discovered

.
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that state and city aid formulas were based
on reading achievement

—

and District 12 was doing so well that it was
being allotted less
aid

When she was Superintendent, Dr. Gaines' staff
undertook some
studies with the scant resources at their disposal.

"Those studies

were good enough to show us clearly two things:"
(1)

Schools can make a difference, certainly for poor

children
(2)

And

I

don

t

care what the Coleman Report says."

Secondly, that difference can be made at any grade level.

The myths that disadvantaged children were inalterably hindered in
and segregated schools, and that early childhood education was

the only hope for overcoming that disadvantage did not hold up in

District 12.
Dr. Gaines outlined some of the key strategies for change in

District 12:
(1)

Establish a non-threatening situation

can do it."

— "and

I

think you

There is no need to fire the principals to get change.

"What you have is totally better than what you think it is."
(2)

You have to enhance averageness.

Teachers are too busy

to develop curriculum even if they have the skills to do so.

You

ask them to share in the process so you can use their insights.

A

coordinator helps the teacher and paraprof essionals provide support.
The program must have limited complexity and be easy to communicate.
(3)

No long pre-training program was necessary.

usually are in

a

vacuum.

Such programs

Begin the program in the teacher's classroom
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with

a

person there who understands and accepts the
program.

That's

where the training takes place.
(4)

Don

take new ideas and accept them wholesale.

t

adapted programs to the teachers' and students’ needs.

Dr. Gaines

It did not

matter which linguistic approach was used— ITA was used
in classes
without kindergarten preparation; Miami Linguistics was used
in
schools with large Spanish populations; Sullivan "Project Read"
was
used in most schools; and Sullivan McGraw-Hill and Gattegno were
used
in some schools.

They all worked.

And where the principal really

bought it, it worked even better.
Dr. Gaines is now working for the Board as Director of the

Learning Cooperative.

She spoke of the frustration that increases

the higher up you work in the system.

But she reiterated her positive

belief that "all kinds of bits fall into place when you keep your
eyes on the goal of improving education for children."

3.

—

Beyond the Basic Skills the Challenge
of Accumulated Failure

When teachers and principals do not care, and children are
caught in the self-fulfilling prophecy of failure, the problems of

accumulated failures and despair are passed on to the intermediate
and high schools.

Then a student faces the threat of failures in

school and the fear of not making it, by standards of the streets and
of the world behind the television screen.

Students may protest

through delinquency, drug addiction, and vandalism.

Whether a youth

fights back or rides with the system, his needs for basic survival--
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for money to dress well, date, have a car,
and maintain

status— are

very real.
Any awareness of the needs and lives of teenagers
exposes the

hypocrisy of the standard myth that education is preparation
for
life.

At the earliest of elementary levels, separation of
education

and life is a false dichotomy.

Poor and minority youths learn

rapidly what a fraud that "life" will be, how few of their aspirations and talents will be utilized.

High schools, especially in

urban areas, are facing the fact that they must figuratively and

literally tear down their walls.

Without a convincing connection

between an individual’s experience outside the classroom and his
daily school work, the hope factor in a youth's education disintegrates

.

Secondary educational reform in the 1950

's

was initiated by

the universities seeking better prepared students.

Advanced place-

ment preparation and an upgrading of science, mathematics, and language brought college level curricula into the high schools.

That

curricular reform succeeded in the academic high schools because the

validity of universities and colleges as certifiers, even as
"preparation for life," went unquestioned.

a

That assumption no longer

stands unchallenged, and the reform of intermediate and high schools

will now have to come from a more legitimate base in order to succeed.
Some of that impetus for reform is coming from the students

themselves and from their parents.

Some is coming from a new genera-

tion of teachers and administrators in urban schools.
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Luther Seabrook is a black intermediate school
principal in New

York City.

His strength, style and programs for change
are shaking

up more than just his school, I.S. 44, and the
surrounding community
of the Upper West Side.

In his previous position as Principal of
the

Highland Park Free ^School in Roxbury, Massachusetts,
he described
his goal in these words:

...to demonstrate to black parents that

hlsck children can have a successful educational experience in

a

Black-controlled, non-destructive educational institution.” 9
Now, operating in what he recognizes as one of "the genocidal

institutions called public schools," Seabrook plans to change some
of the paradoxical discriminations allowed in "public" schools.

New York, open enrollment, like integration, had become

In

a farce;

"special" high schools meant public prep schools for the advantaged
and lucky; and time and again, the bureaucracy raised fresh barriers
to innovation.

When Seabrook arrived as Principal late in the spring of 1970,
the school was in "bad shape."

Serving a student population that

was 41 percent Spanish-speaking (largely Puerto Rican)

,

29 percent

white, and 30 percent black, I.S. 44 had rigidly tracked classes, with

predictable internal segregation.

Of the 340 students scheduled to

graduate, 160 were not going to receive the accredited diplomas

necessary for academic high schools.

Seabrook immediately instituted

^Luther W. Seabrook, "A New Experiment in Black Education,"
Social Policy May/June, 1970, p. 61.
,
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a crash tutoring program:

in two and a half months, counselors,

teachers, and parent tutors worked to cut that number
to 28

.

Seabrook chose a few immediate goals and set out to
accomplish
thee.*

..tc.

.fwi*

ng

,

to raise reading scores of minority children,

and to get parents involved in their children's learning
and the

school

s

curriculum.

Above all, he sought to convince teachers that

bheir children could learn and qualify for the elitist special

high schools of New York City.
To upgrade reading he brought in Dr. Gattegno to demonstrate

and implement a new reading approach.

The program works because

its philosophy is that minority children can learn.

Reading tests

are administered every two months for all children.

As a result,

teachers become more aware of the importance of the task and become

more accountable for how their children perform.

The frequent tests

also prove to parents and children that tests cannot hurt.

The school originally had four tracks.

Seabrook cut these to

two, working patiently with teachers to gradually move toward

heterogeneity at a rate they could tolerate.

Tracking in the sixth

and seventh grade was dropped by the fall of 1971.

In the new

program for I.S. 44 that Seabrook is implementing, the sixth grade
will focus on two goals:

getting kids up to grade level in reading

and giving them a chance to explore and orient to the school.

The

sixth grade now has two open classrooms, heterogeneously grouped.
In the seventh grade, the entire curriculum will focus on the

humanities, straight academic courses, "giving them

a year of real
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education, perhaps the only one they’ll
get.”

In eighth grade, the

children are "programmed" by interest and
talent and according to
what high school they wish to attend.

All eighth grade children take

the competitive special high school entrance
tests; all aim to get in.

Parents from the community have been involved in
every new

program from tutoring for the special high school
entrance exams to
operating a breakfast program to formulating new pro-jects.

One

current proposal now being worked out calls for an Institute
for

Parents of Disadvantaged Children in which parents can assist
in the

planning for a better school and will be paid $10.00 for each
meeting
they attend— enough to break even on expenses.
in Seabrook s school show already.

The early successes

Parents, even administrators

in Harlem schools, are urging children to transfer to I.S. 44.

Seabrook has adopted

a

risk-taking strategy which is reflected

in his willingness to speak his beliefs in front of anyone

students, parents, bureaucrats, or visitors.

with human activity and concern

— kids

— teachers,

His office bustles

with gripes, jokes, and problems:

parents who trust him; teachers who believe in the hope for change
and are grappling with the adjustments for change.

style brings him criticism from all sides

liberals as well.

— black

Admittedly, his

leaders and white

Crucially, he tolerates the pressure and ambigui-

ties and communicates a clear understanding of what is.

Luther Seabrook's new school has barelv begun, but all signs
point toward

a

dramatic demonstration of what integrated schools in

an inner city could look like.

His leadership, his guts, and positive
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style -realistic and hopeful— demonstrate
the potential for change
in urban schools, and for racial and
ethnic cooperation in a bigoted
city.

Seabrook operates with determination and
grim humor— what does

he (or the kids'

’

^'v^lose?

4.

Schools Without Walls

The purposes and goals of high school education are
not easily

described, especially for inner city schools.

If the primary goal

of urban elementary schools is at least definable as
preparation for

high school, the problems of high school education lie in
profound
ignorance about what skills, experience, and wisdom are necessary

"preparation for life."

Discussions about appropriate curriculum,

conflicts between Blacks and whites, drug use and abuse, truancy and
drop outs, vandalism and violence, student rights and faculty rules
for proper conduct are but the more obvious manifestations of a

fundamental problem.

Unbelievably, high schools have acted as though education can
take place only if classrooms can be protected from outside problems.
But police do enter the schools.

Doctors and nurses, human relations

specialists, welfare workers, and federal program coordinators are

frequently called in.
commencements.

Politicians and community leaders speak at

None of these specialists, however, is seen as central

to the school or as instructional staff.

Yet the attempt to insulate

students from real life has not quieted student dissatisfaction.
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Paul Goodman has emphasized the gap between the
so-called purposes and preparation in high school education and
the economic and

social realities that await most high school graduates:

"The point-

lessness of the years of schooling is a chief cause of
youth dissent
and truancy, at increasingly earlier ages.

Naturally, having known

no other dispensation, the students do not know what to
ask for." 10

A suburban youth may resist the endless education certification demands
that take him from college board exams through graduate work in prepa-

ration for roles he vaguely understands or accepts.

A minority urban

youth may rebel against the sham of his high school education as

a

"preparation for life."
There are no easy answers to the problem of reform in the high
schools.

Some would close them down; others would tighten "security."

Most educational reformers are anxious to explore alternatives and, at
least, to free students to make choices about their own futures.
In Portland, Oregon, the John Adams High School has undertaken

large-scale reform without a volunteer or specially selected student
population.

Adams is

a

district high school, representing

a

broad

spectrum; most of the students are from working-class and lower-middle
class families; about one quarter of its 1,280 students are black.

Both a comprehensive high school and a training laboratory in teacher

education affiliated with Oregon State University and Northwest

10

Paul Goodman, "Statement," in U. S. Congress House Committee on
Education and Labor, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Needs of Elementary
and Secondarv Education for the Seventies (1970), p. 954.

.
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Regional Laboratory, its support troops are numerous.

The structural

reforms at John Adams are not radical, but they are
comprehensive.

Students have considerable voice in the curriculum they
encounter.
Half their daily work is unscheduled.

They can opt for grades or for

credit/no credit.
The principal of John Adams, Robert B. Schwartz, writes, "If
we are going to break past the siege mentality, we need some new

working models of what an urban high school can be."

Piecemeal

tinkering with schedules or the English curriculum or the student
council is not "an adequate response to the problems plaguing high
schools today."
their own lives

plans

— cannot

11

The commitment to students’ freedom to control

— in

curriculum, social relationships, or career

be made step by step.

Unstructured independent study

and policing of corridors are contradictions that students clearly

perceive
Schwartz does not see a reformed high school such as John Adams
as a panacea for the social problems of this nation which erupt in

high schools as well as elsewhere.

"One lesson here is that any

school moving toward a more open curriculum organization, or governing structure in hopes of reducing conflict or pacifying dissent is

doomed to disappointment."

12

As students feel free to direct their

own learning experiences, topics such as drugs, racial antagonisms,

^Robert B. Schwartz in the New York Times
Review, Monday, January 11, 1971, p. 61.
^Schwartz

New York Times,

p.

60.

:
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sex, and other classroom "taboos" will come
into the open.

While

such openness may not solve these problems, as
Schwartz has emphasized, at least the hypocrisy of an adult world
trying to launder

reality for youth will disappear.

Students and adults at John Adams

are trying to balance the stress and the rewards of
eliminating that

hypocrisy.

During 1970-1971 Brooklyn, New York created John Dewey High
School as a freer alternative to traditional city high schools.

Com-

prised of a voluntary student body from Brooklyn districts, the
school represents a broad spectrum of backgrounds and achievement.

Admission is on

a first

come first serve basis.

About one third of

the students are Black or Puerto Rican.

The school has an eight hour day of modularized flexible

scheduling.

A course might last anywhere from forty minutes to

eighty minutes a day, offered one or five times a week, and last from
seven to thirty-five weeks.

One quarter of a student's time is free

for independent study in the library, resource centers of each depart

ment

,

or in the informal atmosphere of the cafeteria.

Students can

complete high school in three, four or five years, with the option of
summer attendance.

Individual progress depends on the mastery of pre

scribed course objectives.

Students can elect to master a course

entirely on their own using DISK independent study kits, and grades
are essentially pass/fail.

John Dewey's attractive physical plant, located at 50 Avenue
and the volunteer status of its students and faculty reflect the

X,

77

optimism and high degree
the school.

of-

student participation and initiative at

But as its principal, Sol Levine, formerly
head of one

of Manhattan s most notoriously troubled high
schools, emphasized,

John Dewey is an alternative, not necessarily a model for
immediate
mass emulation.

Freedom, responsibility, and happiness are still

essentially alien to most inner-city high schools.
At Polytechnic High School in San Francisco, students have the

option to try out a new kind of high school experience

.

^

In 1969,

Polytechnic had hit the bottom when dropout and absenteeism rates

were high, the curriculum had long since lost usefulness and interest
for the students, and its ancient building had been condemned by the

new earthquake regulations.

With the aid of consultants from the

Institute for the Advancement of Urban Education, the school set out
to find new structures and curriculum.

Students, teachers, parents,

community leaders’, former students, drop-outs, and junior high prospective students were surveyed to find out their views of the high
school and their desires for a new high school.

The most important result of the survey and of many workshops
was the drawing together of the entire community to reform the school.
Students, parents, and educators began talking together and sharing
their concerns and problems.

The immediate, tangible result was the

Student-Directed Curriculum (SDC) implemented in Fall, 1971.

Through

13 The source for the material on Polytechnic High School is a
dissertation by Bobby F. Gentry, "Differentiated Staffing in Urban

Schools" (University of Massachusetts, March, 1972).

"
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the SDC, students chose topics they wished to
pursue.

They worked

with teachers to draw up mini-courses for each area of
interest.
Each mini-course contained specific content, goals, methods,
and
evaluation procedures.
using facilities

ai\d

Many of the courses called for students

involving personnel from the larger community.

A differentiated staff provided the resources to make SDC work.
Topics for the mini-courses ranged from drugs, the law, genetics,
literature, and politics to Black History.

Because the students have a real voice in their curriculum, and
because the participatory process has been real, student and faculty

morale has soared and attendance is significantly improved.

Most

important, the community has begun to feel that Polytechnic is "their

school

.

The Parkway School in Philadelphia has become an exciting model
for high schools of the future throughout the country.

The design

of the Parkway School, according to its original Director, John

Bremer, was based on the premise that the high school "has reached
the end of its development.
tution.""*"^

We need a new kind of educational insti-

Parkway, a "school without walls," seeks the functional

integration of the educational community with the business and cultural community in Philadelphia.

The belief is that for education to

be relevant, especially for an urban youth, it must have some vital

1969 mimeographed booklet, "The Parkway Program,"
published by the Philadelphia School System and the Parkway Program,

^From

p.

5.

a May,

—
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connections to the social, economic, and political
structures of the
real world.
The Parkway Program, begun in Fall of 1968,
sought a new approach
to curriculum, to the purposes of education, and
to student responsi-

bilities.

As Bremer described it, "The year round Parkway Program

sets up new boundaries, and provides a new framework in
which the

energy of all of us can be used in learning, and not in
maintaining
an obsolete, inefficient system."

School is not a place, a building

or a classroom, but a process of teaching and learning:

"We are,

indeed," Bremer insisted, "a school without walls." 15
The students, volunteers drawn by lot from all Philadelphia's

districts (and some suburban districts)

,

choose their own programs

of study, travel on their own from place to place, and attend school

beyond the traditional nine to three, September to June schedule.

Tutorial groups of about fifteen students, a teacher intern, and

a

regular faculty member meet regularly for counseling, work on basic
skills, and personal evaluation.

Courses are pass/fail, and the pro-

gram offers a full four year high school program leading to a city-

approved diploma.
The program is an experimental branch of the Philadelphia public

schools and operates at no higher per pupil cost than the regular

high schools.

No expensive showcase physical plant is required

"classrooms" are scattered all over the Parkway area wherever resources

15

Bremer, "The Parkway Program,"

p.

5.

$

80

are located.

Although Parkway has-

a

regular staff and teacher

interns to provide basic instruction and counseling, many
of its

teachers are volunteers from cooperating institutions.

The boldness

of involving non-accredited teachers who are professionals
from

other fields is perhaps the most significant aspect of Parkway’s

model for urban education of the future.
The city is the curriculum.

About 100 businesses, civic

organizations, and cultural institutions, many located along the

Benjamin Franklin Parkway, provide their facilities and staff for
educational programs for Parkway students.

Students find at such

varied places as the Franklin Institute, the Museum of Art, the
Insurance Company of North America, Smith, Kline, and French,
station KYW, and the Philadelphia Bulletin and Inquirer opportunities
to learn skills for inquiry, communication, analysis, and research

within a concrete, relevant setting.
The initial success of Parkway rested on its timing with

reform administration in the Philadelphia schools under
Superintendent, Dr. Mark Shedd

.

a

a

new

It rested equally on the leadership

of Bremer, a forty-four year old British-born former principal in

Two Bridges decentralized school district in New York Citv.

Bremer's

description of the political side of education at Parkway aptly
illustrated the political awareness and poetic idealism he para-

doxically embraced:

"education and politics are inseparable

activities and... every educational act is

a

political act."

welcomed that confusion of the ideal and the real, "for

He

if politics
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is concerned with power,

education is concerned with love, and
one

without the other is corrupting.

Power without love produces

tyranny, love without power produces anarchy."

Parkway represented

the necessary union of the educator and the
politician "to bring
into harmony these two forces,

(for)

the future of all of us depends

on the accomplishment of this difficult task." 16
Iti

the fall of 1970, John Bremer resigned from Parkway.

A

growing gulf between Bremer and Superintendent Shedd reached a climax
over the closing of the Paxon School, an elementary pilot expansion
of Parkway.

Whether

it

Parkway survived and is now under new management.
will become more traditional remains an open question.

But in response to the success of Parkway, other districts are plan-

ning similar projects.
(METRO)

In 1969-1970 the Metropolitan High School

in Chicago was established with the support of the Chicago

Board of EducatioA.

Washington, D. C.; Hartford, Connecticut;

Worcester, Massachusetts; and several other cities have made commit-

ments to develop their own school without walls.
Thus, the Parkway model of a "school without walls" may be the
first step in transforming the American high school into a useful,

dynamic institution.

At the very least it forces some fresh thinking

about the role of high schools and how they should be linked into the
adult world.

In the absence of professional knowledge about what a

high school should look like and train for,

^Bremer, "The Parkway Program,"

p.

10.

it

seems important to allow
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students choices and to involve a wide range
of non-professionals in
the curriculum.

Urban Change Models

5.

As the crisis in urban schools became apparent
and no one solu-

tion emerged, many districts set up experimental
change models to gain
support, alleviate dissent, and foster the top down through
experi-

mental examples of new directions disseminated throughout the
system
by demonstration, inservice training, workshops, and change
teams.

Curriculum development laboratories, learning centers, innovations
teams, magnet model schools and regional labs all seek to stimulate

curricular, structural and attitudinal reforms by example.

Recently, some cities have opted for system-wide change.

now classic example of

a

The

system-wide attempt at reform is the story

of Mark Shedd s super intendency in Philadelphia.
'

The Shedd years

in Philadelphia, from 1967 to 1971, were characterized by aggressive,

massive changes, undertaken with bitter fights, some extraordinary
successes and some dismal failures.

Shedd was ousted in Fall, 1971,

after an overwhelming reaction of forces against him helped elect

Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo to Mayor.

But the end of the story

of the impact of the Shedd years has yet to be written.

When he took office in 1967, Shedd hired

a

sparkling staff of

bright non-educators (the "Ivy Maffia") to get the deteriorated

Philadelphia schools back on their feet.

To replace the more than

70 percent obsolete and hazardous school buildings, Shedd and his

.

.

.
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supportive Board, including former reform
Mayor Richardson Dilworth,

undertook

a

massive building program.

The school budget over the

course of four years more than doubled.
One of the first steps of Shedd's reformers
was to open up the
system.

They administered city-wide national
achievement tests and

published the discouraging results.
public and televised.

Board meetings were open to the

Students met in weekend retreats for basic

encounter with principals and were given more voice
in school

governance
Shedd's reforms attracted millions of dollars in federal
aid,
and his leadership fostered innovative schools and
programs throughout the city,

including the Parkway Program, Pennsylvania Advancement

School, Learning Center projects, a network of "magnet" schools,
and

computer— assisted instruction.

Philadelphia developed a charismatic

atmosphere for change that attracted young, creative personnel with

new ideas into the central administration as well as many eager new
teachers
Real change proved much harder to achieve than the charisma of
change.

For most of Philadelphia's children and teachers, schooling

went on as before.

The changes were often scattered and unconnected

by an overall strategy for structural reform.

Many old-time adminis-

trators felt threatened and resisted the innovation proselytizers
Ironically, opening up the system was much of Shedd's undoing.
The changes brought about were dramatic.

But many problems

achievement, student unrest, racial antagonisms

— were

— low

not going to

.
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go away overnight.

In one confrontation in 1967, Shedd
alienated

Commissioner Rizzo.

Rizzo's anti-Shedd campaign calling
for hard-

line discipline and more emphasis on the
3R’s spoke for many of

Philadelphia's white blue-collar citizens.

"In opening up the system

for inspection, Shedd and Dilworth invited
citizens to take a look
at all the problems that had been swept
under the rug for so long.

Somehow, Rizzo then succeeded in blaming the new
housecleaners for
the mess they had inherited
As a result of the Shedd-Rizzo confrontation, the
Philadelphia

schools have been increasingly politicized.
>

Matthew Costanzo, has inherited

of change.

a

But the new Superinten-

system heady with the taste

Rizzo will probably be held more accountable than any

previous mayor for the success or failure of the schools.
tempting to say that Shedd

's

It

is

efforts were a front-line "suicide

mission" which, wKether necessary or not, brought new life to

a

dying

system that will no longer accept the status quo.
As the Philadelphia reform administration was facing the end
of its tenure, another city, Louisville, Kentucky, was embarking

on system-wide change.

In the fall of 1970, the Louisville School

District began a large-scale program for reform, funded as an EPDA
(Education Professions Development Act) demonstration project.

Louisville is
for change.

a

relatively small city with some ready advantages

Racial balance in the schools is still possible: the

-^Peter Binzen, "Philadelphia: Politics Invades the Schools,"
Saturday Review February 5, 1972, p. 48.
,
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schools are relatively unpoliticlzed-many
teachers are not unionised
or anti-administration; and both
Louisville newspapers have supported

the demand for educational change.

The students

black and white.

m

Louisville schools are approximately
balanced,

Over a third are very poor— from families
with an

annual income of $2,000 or less.

Almost three fourths of the dis-

trict's 60,000 children scored below the national
average on achievement tests.

Acknowledging that "despite increased staff efforts and

resource utilization, traditional educational approaches
"were" not
proving effective in coping with these problems," the
Louisville
School District initiated Project Transition, "a series of
programs

designed to bring about major changes in its educational structure,
program and processes." 18

Through the combined support of federal

funds, a forward looking integrated Board, a dedicated new superinten-

dent, Dr. Newman Walker, and cooperation with the University of

Louisville, the program has promise for impact.
All the resources and models for change are being channeled
into fourteen of the system's seventy schools, designated Focus and

Impact Schools.

The staffs are differentiated

— teachers,

Teacher

Corps interns, and paraprof essionals work in teaching teams for

"families" of students.

Part of their task is to develop new, rele-

vant curricula for the many poor and minority students.

The teacher

is viewed as facilitator, and the principal's role has been revamped

I

O

From an unpublished proposal by the Louisville Independent
School District.
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to embody 80 percent instructional time
as "principal-learning-

facilitator."

Community involvement, sensitivity training,
computer-

assisted instruction, imaginative evaluation
design, and heterogeneous
grouping in open classrooms are all part of the
multi-pronged approach
to change.

The goals of the program are set high, including
dramatic

improvement in reading scores, improved attendance records,
higher
student self-concepts, and less vandalism and hostile
behavior.
a year,

After

most participants in the bold experiment agreed that
prepara-

tions for such massive change were inadequate.

Fresh interns and

young teachers found the challenge of openness and freedom, curriculum development, discipline problems, and constant self-evaluation

rather overwhelming.

And many parents were skeptical of the apparent

disorder and lack of discipline.

Superintendent Walker reflected after the first year that the
emphasis on personal growth through T-groups was "the right content,
but the process was contradictory."

His reform strategy has now

adapted to the more immediate need for community participation.

Neighborhood boards have become major forces in designing and imple-

menting changes.

While some of Walker’s original visions have been

curtailed by community desires, his larger hope for "a system of

educational alternatives so that people have

a choice" is

becoming

a reality.

iq

Terry Borton, "Reform Without Politics in Louisville,
Saturday Review February 5, 1972, p. 54.
,
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Within various urban systems, change
models designed to go
beyond reform of an individual school
have emerged.

Pennsylvania Advancement School in Philadelphia
is
model set up as

a

I

a

unique change

non-profit corporation, under contract to
the

school district of Philadelphia

Title

The

,

in September, 1967.

Supported by

and Title III funds, school district
resources, and some

money from private foundations and EPDA, the school
was designed as
an experimental curriculum development and staff
development institu
tion.

The school itself, located in a renovated warehouse at
Fifth
and Luzerne Streets, offers alternative schooling to
seventh and

eighth grade "underachieving" boys and girls from the public
and

parochial schools.

The conspicuous non-school setting is one of the

most striking features of the school.

Visitors to the renovated

factory are amazed to find school going on in an environment of open
spaces, carpets, brightly painted walls covered with student art,

posters and photographs, and the free movement of people from place
to place.

The students find themselves in a setting which allows

vigorous activity and exploration and encourages informal, honest

relationships with other students and adults.
The corporate autonomy of the school allows for the development
of a unique staff drawn from many fields and experiences.

Surveying

the problems and promise of Pennsylvania Advancement School, Henry

Resnik noted:

^
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The real distinction of the staff, it
became clear as
time went on, was its being one of the
best informed,
most consciously innovative groups of
teachers in the
country.
One could spend a dav at the Advancement
School and find out just about everything new
that was
happening in the world of education.
Staff members not only develop new curriculum
growing out of applied

theories and experience, but are provided with
time and support in

writing up the curriculum and sharing it with other
schools in the
public school system.

Pennsylvania Advancement is a think tank for

curriculum development and human relations, stimulating change
in
the traditional system by means of workshops, personnel
exchange,
and dissemination of materials.

A somewhat different model, although similar in its goals,

underlay the Washington Innovations Team in Washington,

D.

C.

The

Innovations Team is a group of experienced teachers from the system
who have been released from regular assignments and given the special

task of developing and disseminating curriculum innovations throughout

Washington’s elementary schools.

The team runs xrorkshops in new

reading programs and mathematics approaches, supports teachers with

in-service training, and conducts workshops in human relations.

Thev

focus on improving education for poor and minority children and

developing curriculum that will meet their needs.

Most of the team

are black, and their goals include facilitating inter-racial understanding and more empathetic responses to minority children.

War in Philadelphia
Henry Resnik, Turning on the System
Public Schools (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), p. 76.
:
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Most urban school systems have resource
centers or learning
labs where new ideas are developed.
of federal regional laboratories,

This model inspired the funding

set up in cooperation with uni-

versities to further educational research
and teacher training.

The

Northwest Regional Lab cooperates with the
University of Oregon and
the Portland Schools in the design and
implementation of the John

Adams model high school.

Southwest Regional Lab in Los Angeles,

working closely with UCLA, explores new ideas which
include teacher
training, reading programs utilizing new technology,
and computerized
data processing of student performance.

The Center for Urban

Education in New York City works with local universities to
publish
research studies on urban education.
The greatest value of these innovation models is the implication that curriculum and teaching methods should be flexible, con-

stantly up-dated

,'

and scrutinized.

Laboratory situations which seek

new methods and new content emphasize that there may be many different
ways to teach and learn.

They suggest that schools do not have to

be carbon copies of each other; and they hold out hope for variety
and innovation within the system.

Their greatest weakness is the limitation of their impact.

Such

changes spread over a large territory and usually aimed at only one
segment of a school or system are often diluted beyond recognition.

School systems have deeply ingrained habits that usually require

more than selective prodding.

Without a thorough change in knowledge

and values, behavioral change is likely to be short-lived.

Summer

1
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sensitivity workshops wear off quickly in the
press of September's
familiar routine.

A second weakness, the top down approach to
instigating change
is difficult to achieve.

As Newman Walker in Louisville recognized,

all of the change at the top won’t make any difference
unless things
are different in the schools."

^

Studies in change theory suggest

that only through planned group participation is
large-scale change

ensured.

The real impact of charismatic leadership in the cities

does not come from imposing innovation from above, but from
creating
in the city schools and community the hope factor.

Teachers become

inspired for success, parents come to believe change is possible,
and those who were previously powerless reenter the democratic

process of public education.

2

-‘-Terry Borton, "Reform Without Politics in Louisville,"
Saturday Review February 5, 1972, p. 55.
,
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CHAPTER

IV

COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO FAILURE
AND NON-SCHOOL ALTERNATIVES

Perhaps there was a time when inner city
parents believed that
the burden of academic failure fell on
their homes and their children's

inadequacies and accepted without question the
remoteness of an

unaccountable principal and condescending teachers.

But teachers’

strikes and public criticisms of schools have
increased political

awareness of parents and community leaders.

Parents are questioning

the persistent failures of minority children in an
educational system

dominated by white, middle-class educators and bureaucrats.
A disillusionment with liberal rhetoric, with teachers,
counselors and administrators, and with poverty programs has
led to the

emergence of new community responses.

Within the public school option,

all the varieties of the "community control" concept strive to shake

loose the centralized power of white bureaucrats and to return power
to the local communities the schools supposedly serve.

Because many

have become skeptical of the possibility for any real autonomy within
the system, non-public options have mushroomed in inner city communities:

free schools, street academies, mini-schools in store fronts,

community action centers for tutoring, drop-out centers, job training
and job development agencies.

Such alternatives are small-scale and numerous.

They avoid the

bureaucratic procedures of pension programs and tenure, lesson plans

to be filed each morning, and
expensive commitments to standardized

curriculum.

Thus, the schools have far greater
flexibility.

Further

they have lower per pupil costs than
regular school districts.

Community-oriented free schools can be found in
every area of
the country.

In Boston, three private elementary
schools— the New

School for Children, the Roxbury Community
School, and the Highland

Park Free School

teach children in open classrooms staffed
by

teams of certified teachers, community teachers,
and parent aides.
In many cities,

low budget mini-schools that serve children
from a

single city block have sprung up, privately staffed
bv parents and

volunteers and funded however possible.

The Multi-Culture Institute

in San Francisco serves young children from white,
black, Chicano

and Asian-American backgrounds.

The success of these alternatives provides "a model for demonstrat ion of those principles which public schools have freauentlv

professed and have rarely put into practice."^

Because thev are

innovations from the ground up, thev offer participants the sense of

controlling their own destinies and the hope for change.

Their weak-

ness is that by dropping out of the system, they avoid the question
of America’s commitment to equality of education for all in a public

system.

^Joshua L. Smith, "Free Schools:
Leadership February, 1971, p. 468.
,

Pandora’s Box," Educat ional
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A Second Chance

1.

— Successful

Schools for Dropouts

On the high school level, private alternatives
to inner city

public schools serve those the system has already
lost or rejected—
the dropouts.

In Springfield, Massachusetts, in a former
supermarket

in the Northend-Brightwood area, forty-five
students are being

trained for college futures at SASSI Prep (Street Academy
of Springfield
System, Inc.).

The original SASSI Director, William Smith, a
young,

black graduate student, founded the school with fellow students
from
the University of Massachusetts, School of Education "Action
Lab for
the Education of High School Dropouts."

The Action Lab began with research into the problem of high

school dropouts, the "shadow generation," organized field trips and

conferences, made contact with community representatives in Springfield,

undertook fund raising, and then, in the summer of 1970, established
pilot program.

a

Although still precariously funded, the school opened

full time on October 5, 1970.

SASSI offers college preparation to students from sixteen to

sixty years old.

Admission is limited to those who have dropped

out of school for at least four months and are free of drug addiction.

Eleven teaching staff offer core courses, electives, counseling, and
special emphasis on "testmanship" to students preparing for college
education.

As an independent school, SASSI Prep worries little about

state certification and focuses on negotiations with various colleges

a
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to accept its students on the
basis of College Board performance
and

their individual experiences at SASSI
Prep.

Everyone on the staff —administrators

secretary— teaches classes.

,

teachers, even the

Classes are very small, with frequent

tutoring on a one to one basis.

The dedication of the staff is most

clearly reflected in the fact that when funds
for staff salaries ran
out from November to February, they kept
right on teaching.

The

school has struggled through an exciting and
precarious first year,
but a measure of its success and credibility with
the community is the
fact that the community newspaper, The Brightwood
Voice
to take over its publication.

students graduated
ties

— all

,

asked SASSI

In June, 1971, thirteen SASSI Prep

have been accepted in colleges and universi-

.

In Chicago, CAM Academy provides dropouts with a second chance
at high school education.

CAM, the Christian Action Ministry, is the

result of the cooperation of eight Protestant and Catholic churches
in the West Garfield Park area.

completion certificate and

a

The school offers

a

tenth grade level

high school equivalency diploma, and 65

percent of its graduates have gone to college.

One CAM student,

Michael, who left public school in order to work, describes why he
came back to school.

"You’re free here.

You can use your own lan-

guage, so it’s not hard to express yourself to a teacher.

In public

schools, the teachers were so busy correcting your English all the
time that you forgot what you wanted to say."

2

"Second Chance Academy," Ebony Magazine

2

,

January, 1971, p. 40.
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CAM Academy Director, Alfred Portis,
works closely with
Rev. Albert Mansah, a native of Ghana,
who also coordinates a CAM

youth exchange with African nations.

CAM is a black self help action

group which also operates day care centers,
job placement and training centers, a small business investment
corporation and housing and

youth programs.

CAM Academy describes itself as a "tuned-in,
turned-

on, brand-new school for dropouts

'n

push-outs."^

The well-known prototype for CAM and SASSI is
Harlem Prep in

New York City.

Now in its third year, the school offers college

preparatory education to some 400 students.

Harlem Prep represents

the third tier in a complex of private street academies
funded by the

Urban League, foundations, and private corporations to serve
high
school dropouts in Harlem.

The first level offers the high school

equivalency diploma and job training.

A second tier of "transition"

prepares for Harlem Prep or other private schools, and

a

third tier

provides intensive college preparation.

Harlem Prep's black director, Ed Carpenter,
is fighting for the support of Harlem Prep,

a former boxer,

now

for integrated staff and

students, and for the future of minority kids to compete in American
society.

Of the 205 students graduated in the past four years, only

four have not completed a college preparatory degree.

The June gradua-

tion, held at the corner of 125th Street and Lennox Avenue near the

Hotel Theresa, represents to many Harlem residents the tangible
success of their high school.

3

"Second Chance Academy," p. 42.
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The street academy model gained
national recognition yet has faced

serious financial difficulties.
support began to dwindle.

By the late Sixties, corporation

"Whatever their successes in salvaging
the

system’s ghetto dropouts, they had remained
peripheral to the system
that created the dropouts in the first
place.

In 1969,

in an

attempt to create an alternative within the
public school option, the

New York Coalition and McGraw-Hill in cooperation
with the New York
Board of Education established a pilot mini-school,
Harambee Prep.
The 100 students enrolled were still, if barely, on
the formal rolls
of the school system.

In fall, 1970, Wingate Prep, sponsored by the

Coalition and Pfitzer, Inc., opened in
Brooklyn.

a

warehouse storefront in

In spring, 1971, the New York Board of Education, using

federal and state funds, opened two additional mini-schools.

Although technically alternatives within the city svstero, New
York’s mini-schools owe much of their design and flavor to the private
street academies.

The desire for mini— alternative schools has emerged

throughout the system where large, prison-like, impersonalized high
schools have ceased to function as educational institutions.

High School,

a

Haaren

huge (2,500 students) ghetto high school for boys, is

being restructured into a complex of fourteen subject or themeoriented schools.
At the mini-schools, students have a voice in selecting their

teachers.

The schools provide refuge for dropout students and

—

^Diane Divoky, "New York's Mini-Schools Small Miracles, Big
Troubles," Saturday Review, December 18, 1971, p. 60.
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teachers alike.

alternatives.

The administrators are energetic
and ready to seek

Young, black Director of Wingate Prep,
Roy Roberts,

presents a striking contrast to typical
urban administrators.
is so striking about

Robert .infers, perceptiveness

"What

to his students'

needs, his flexibility about rules, and his
openness about school

problems."

The mini-school staffs include street
workers, who pro-

vide a direct link between the students’ in-school
and out-of-school
problems.

Characteristic of the flexibility at Wingate,

a teacher

sometimes does street worker duties, and street workers
sometimes
teach classes.

Through Roberts’ persistence, the school board has allowed
credit
to be given for independent study, community service,
work at other

agencies and institutions, and even for time spent in detention.

Parkway type experiences are being developed to give students practical input for career development.

In contrast to the healthy atmosphere at Wingate Prep, the

larger experiment to transform Haaren High School overnight into a
series of mini-schools has resulted so far in chaos and rigidity.

The rules and regulations of the old system are oddly intertwined

with the new rhetoric.

On the first day of newly-instituted inde-

pendent study activities, the principal sent out a mimeographed form

which began, "All college bound students are required to select and
attend a voluntary activity at the end of fifth period."^

^Diane Divoky,

p.

62.

^Diane Divoky,

p.

67.

.
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Perhaps the street academies and mini-schools
succeeded at once

because of their small size, uniqueness, and
peripheral status in the
system.

Trying to bring the concept back to the massive
high schools

within the system poses many problems yet to be solved
by the
reformers at the Urban Coalition and the Board of
Education.

2.

Westside Study Center

— Curriculum

for a Community

The Westside Study Center in Pasadena, California, is a
communitv-

action agency providing

a

wide community curriculum for ghetto resi-

dents whom the public schools have failed.

Begun in 1965 as a

neighborhood tutoring center, Westside grew in two years to encompass
job training and job development, adult education, and legal and

social services.
a

"The story of Westside Study Center revealed, through

kind of revenge imprinting, the failures of urban education in

America.

Organized in response to

a need for a broad

range of self

help programs, the Center showed most clearly what had not been
done

Westside Study Center was organized around the idea of self
help.

Everyone on the staff was enrolled in some educational program

while helping others further their education.

The tutoring program

served young children from the public schools, potential dropouts,

^Atron A. Gentry, unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Hope
Factor: The Growth of the Westside Study Center, 1965-1968," (School
of Education, University of Massachusetts, June, 1970), p. 104.
Dr. Gentry was founder and Director of Westside Study Center from
1965-1968.
His dissertation is the primary source for the material
in this section.
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former dropouts or high school graduates
seeking further skills,
adult functional illiterates, and college
graduates seeking further
training.

Members of the staff were both raising their
own educa-

tional and experiential levels while passing
on their skills to
others.

The charismatic atmosphere of hope and
possibilities at

Westside brought together young and old, black and
white, dropouts
and university professors, businessmen and
activists.

Self help

involved the subtle problem of creating the power

to control at least a part of one's own life and a
part of one's own

community."

The concept was complex and paradoxical:

"From the

point of view of many in the ghetto, anyone who had boots with
straps

had already escaped."

g

Through sharing their own struggles with

others, and by taking on increasing responsibilities, the Westside
staff was able to build trust in the community and provide a working

model of self help.
The contrast between Westside

's

model of self help and other

welfare and service agencies was striking.

Most agencies operated

on the assumption that their clients lacked power, motivation, or

knowledge.

They would typically come into the ghetto community and

conduct another survey.

"By implication. Blacks and poor people

could not even grasp their own plight." q

Whatever assistance they

offered beyond another set of statistics usually assumed continuation
of the status quo.

^Gentry, p. 12.
^Gentry, p. 14.
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While Westside was developing', the
Civil Rights Movement of the
1960's was moving away from appeals to the
white majority for legal
and social equality to emphasis on
self help and self determination.

The tangible successes of Westside Study
Center provided a meeting

ground for both moderate civil rights groups
and nationalists, for

white liberals and black activists, for businessmen
seeking to improve
their image and for young men and women looking
for job opportunities.

The many activities of Westside built a total
"curriculum for
the community.

Education was formally one of the Center's chief

concerns, but its educational impact extended beyond
courses, tutoring, and job training.

As people became involved in improving condi-

tions within the community— finding jobs, seeking better housing,

helping youths in court, tutoring children, negotiating with civic
and business leaders in Pasadena
of community development.

— they

embarked on the elusive process

Gradually, the lines of knowledge, pride,

and action were built which made the difference between a fragmented

community and a community gaining control of its destiny.
By contrast, Washington's War on Poverty, founded on the concept
of "maximum feasible participation," was creating just the opposite

process.

Poor people's image of the War on Poverty is best summed up

in a selection from the book Black Is

:

"Black is the warm feeling

you have knowing you've created so many good jobs for whites in the

Poverty Program."^

Beyond replicating the bureaucratic top-heavy

structure of most federal programs, the War on Poverty also failed to

lOTurner Brown, Jr., Black Is (New York:

Grove Press, 1969).
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respond to community leadership or
potential power-for obvious

reasons— and seemed

to many .mere riot prevention.

"Most community

action groups found money available only
during the summer months
and mainly for activities involving youths
... Community action had

somehow become community inaction." 11

Through repeated disappoint-

ments over federal funding, the Westside Study Center
learned that
self help also meant self sufficiency.

Westside’s Community Forum illustrated the Center’s charisma
and impact on community development.

Each week fifty to two hundred

local community residents, Pasadena businessmen, and University

professors and students gathered at Westside to hear lectures and
panel discussions.

The topics ranged from job opportunities,

African history, and black power to the American Nazi Party, the
John Birch Society, and drug abuse.

The Community Forum provided

new kind of grass roots adult education.

a

It exposed poor people to

ideas and personalities that newspapers and television rarely afforded.

The failure of the Pasadena public schools to educate poor and

minority children provided the mandate for Westside Study Center.
founders believed that Westside should not have to exist.

A group of

"non-professionals" succeeded where the professionals had given up
or never tried in the first place.

provided

a

Westside’s self help programs

way out of the so-called cycle of poverty by creating a

vital link between those in power and those without power.

11 Gentry,

p.

93.

Its
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simplest terms, Westside succeeded- because
people wanted to come.
No better test for schools could be devised." 12

3*

The Sesame Street Revolution

In 1969-1970, seven million kids turned on to mass
media education.

In Sesame Street, they saw the first national,
non-commercial

educational program for pre-school children. 13
Sesame Street

,

school will never be the same.

The creators of Sesame Street

Children

s

Undoubtedly, after

,

Joan Gantz Cooney and the

Television Workshop, capitalized on their unique position

to create this educational experience.

They had the new medium of

television as a rationale for reexamining traditional assumptions
about education and learning.

The impact and success of their efforts

suggest they asked the right questions.
In the year of planning and research that preceded the first

show, the Workshop staff first asked, "How do we reach the children?"

This vital question, dictated by the nature of the television medium
is asked far too seldom in educational circles.

They began with

researching what would appeal, draw and hold attention.
Their preliminary research turned up some startling conclusions
(not startling perhaps to parents, but startling to educational

l2 Gentry,
1

T

p.

130.

Sesame Street is supported by the U. S. Office of Education,
Carnegie Foundation, Ford Foundation, the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, and many companies and volunteer groups. The show
produces its "product" for less than lq per child per day.
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experts and past producers of T.V. fare for
children).

pre-school children to be

They found

much more sophisticated and "intelligent"

a

audience than was generally assumed.

The children responded to a

fast pace, quick changes, slapstick comedy, and
multi-sensory stimuli.

Imagine the revolution in school curriculum if the
first questions
the educators examined were:

How do we get their attention?

interests them and holds their interest?

What

What do they like?

A common trait of the Children's Television Workshop staff
is
their modesty--modesty about their educational impact and
modesty
about their goals.

They reiterate that they have no intention of

pre-empting teachers and schools.

The program makes no attempt to

present an intact, complete curriculum.

The need for Sesame Street

grew out of the need for education for the twelve million three to
five-year olds, a huge percentage of whom were not in schools and

would not be able to attend schools.^
The vehicle for reaching these children seemed obvious, since

(according to the Neilson Index) children under six averaged 54.1

hours per week watching television.

Research on the importance of

pre-school experiences underlined the impact of inadequate education
on poor and minority children who entered schools behind in basic

skills before they began.

The television for them, as well, was an

obvious vehicle, since even in homes with income less than $5,000

^Ninety-four percent of three-year olds; eighty-four percent
From
of four-year olds; twenty-five percent of five-year olds.
Television for Preschool Children: A Proposal Joan Gantz Cooney,
February 19, 1968.
,
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per year, 90 percent had television
sets.

The authors of Sesame

Street set out to reach this huge audience
in need of education and
to gear the content specifically toward
children in inner cities.

In setting up what educational goals to
pursue, the Workshop

staff again demonstrated invaluable
openmindedness.

presume they knew the waj, but opted for

a

They did not

wide variety of ways,

carefully researched for effectiveness.
In the fall of 1970, after the first full
year of Sesame Street

Mrs. Cooney wrote:

The year of innovative production and the more than a
full year of painstaking research that preceded it
has
proved what the Workshop wanted most of all to demonstrate:
that television has the potential to reach and
teach virtually every pre-school child in this country
regardless of his background, that television can provide
him with the constructive entertainment and intellectual
stimulation he critically needs to begin growing up with
a sense of accomplishment, pride and dignity.
To establish' the learning curriculum for the first year of pro-

duction, the ETW staff worked closely with its research department
and advisors from the fields of education, psychology, and social

science.

They drew up a clearly-defined list of educational goals,

stated in terms of behavioral objectives, in the categories of:

symbolic representation (numbers, letters, geometric forms), cognitive processes (perception, relationships, ordering, reasoning and

problem solving), physical environment, and social environment.

To

translate these objectives into programs, the production staff drew

•^Joan Gantz Cooney, "Memo From The Children's Television
Workshop," 1970.
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on fields as varied as education,
entertainment, and commercial

advertising.

The variety in their staff is reflected
in the variety

of approaches the show utilizes

:

cartoons, songs, live characters,

puppets, film shorts, humor, pathos, repetition,
and direct instruction.

Much of the charm of Sesame Street

'

s

methods derives from the

implied respect for children's wit and perception.

People and puppets

often play jokes on themselves and each other, and no one
worries
that the lesson will be lost at the expense of humor.

For example,

in one sequence a huge letter "W" rests next to Kermit the frog

who is describing the usefulness of "W’s."

Meanwhile, behind his

back, a monster puppet is busily eating away at the letter, forcing

Kermit to change his lecture topic from W to N to V to

I.

A spirit of optimism and experienced success permeates every
level of the staff at Children's Television Workshop.

A visit to

the set at Teletape Productions, 81st and Broadway, is a trip into

humor, music, color, and warm and relaxed human interaction.

mood is informal

— children

move about and play on bikes and swings

during and in between tapings.

The Director, Bob Myhrum, encourages

spontaneous dialogue and experimentation.
staff move about casually.

work and play in

The

a spirit of

Visitors and production

The human characters and the puppets

sustained fantasy

— Big

Bird is real,

with or without a camera on him.
On the set and at the Workshop, one is struck by the enjoyment
and understanding of the staff at all levels.

Much of the success of
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Sesame

S treet

is due to a total staff
dedicated to their goals

and trained together in an understanding
of these goals.

The camera-

men, the actors, the researchers
seem to share an enthusiastic con-

sensus of what they are about.
In the summer of 1970, the entire Sesame
Street cast went on a

nationwide tour to initiate a series of
Utilization Programs.

In

fourteen major cities audiences of up to
15,000 children showed up.
In some places children traveled from other
counties, brought in

busses and cars by parents and volunteers.

Under the direction of

Evelyn Davis and her assistant, Charley Smith,
"Utilization" is
growing to be one of the most exciting spin-offs of
Sesame Street’s
success.

Their goals:

to spread the word of Sesame Street and to

increase the potential audience, especially in the original target,
inner city populations.
In the schools, Utilization hopes to encourage, not the showing
of Sesame

show.

S

tr eet

,

but reinforcement and follow-up of lessons from the

In Detroit, as of February 6, 1970, 25,000 four-year olds are

attending experimental compulsory Saturday pre-schools, using Sesame
Street as part of their curriculum.

In New Jersey a federally-funded

Title VII (ESEA) program is underway to research bilingualizing
Sesame Street through the cooperation of Children's Television Workshop
and the Jersey City State Bilingual Program.

In Dallas, a model three-

year old day care center is being established involving Sesame Street
as its focus and reinforcing lessons from the program.
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The Utilization Program seeks cooperation
from federal, state
•

and local agencies, volunteer grouns,
and community leaders to make
the program more accessible, especially
in areas where VHF stations

are not available, .mtd»A~. ££s <f *vays to
increase follow-through with
i

parents and teachers.

Groups as diverse as the Junior League,
private

industry, and block associations have volunteered
time, space and

television sets.
growing.

A present field staff of fifty-five is active
and

Recruited from inner city communities, most are
from

minority groups and experienced in community participation.

The real

hope of Mrs. Davis and her staff is to initiate activity
that will

produce enduring community action, concern and education.

Much of the impact of Sesame Street is on the parents.

When a

mother sees her child learning from the television program, she
realizes he can and should also learn in school.

The Sesame Street

Mothers' Project" has initiated workshops for mothers to provide

specific tools for participating in their children's education.

Bv

gaining hope for their own children and discovering ways to be more

effective parents, many mothers grow in self-esteem.
In fall, 1971, Children's Television Workshop launched a new

half-hour program designed to help seven to ten year olds learn
reading.

The Electric Company shares many of the features that

make Sesame Street appealing

— fast

pace, humorous incidents, an

integrated cast, music, and cartoons.

guistic problems or new words in

a

Each sequence presents lin-

remarkably painless way.

Dire con-

sequences come to cartoon characters who are slow to read such warnings
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as "Do not bother the giant;- in Vie's
Diner, patrons learn about the

silent "e"; Easy Reader teaches Bill Cosby some
useful words; Fargo

North, Decoder, helps desperate people rearrange
mysterious messages;
and

Love of Chair" parodies soap operas while teaching
words.

After the first eight weeks of broadcasting, Educational
Testing

Service researched learning gains in children who watched
Electric

Company in school.

Of the 200 second graders who were tested, the

half who watched Electric Company showed "a consistent edge over

non-viewers" in tests of basic reading skills.

Children's Television

Workshop also reported that four million children watch the Electric
Company

,

two million of them in schools.

Commissioner Sidney Marland

observed that it typically takes fifteen years for an educational

innovation to reach three percent of the classrooms in schools.

The

Electric Company has already reached forty percent of its intended
audience.

"Perhaps no other innovation in the history of education

has made itself felt among so many people in so short a time." 16

From educational television in Boston,

a

new children's program,

ZOOM, transmits less didactic messages but clearly conveys an educa-

tional theme.

The show is by, for

,

Its integrated

and about children.

cast of young people choose and write their own material.

The viewing

audience is invited to send in Z00MCARDS with suggestions for the show
and responses to questions and surveys.

Films made by children,

-^Summarized in the Report on Educational Research
Capital Publications, Inc.), March
(Washington, D. C.:
p.

8.

1,

1972,
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interviews with children, shots of
children making pottery or playing
sports, games, songs, and slapstick comedy
all convey the creative

potential of children and the fun of children
learning and teaching
their own "curriculum."

Se^

Street, Westside Study Center, and independent
community

schools serve the needs of urban children and
adults who have been

given up for lost by public school systems.

They demonstrate that

schools can be fun and entertaining, that education
can occur in

environments open to the streets and can be taught by
non-professionals
involved with hundreds of "non-school" activities.

Community alternatives prove to the public school systems that
education can work in

a

low cost, non-bureaucrat ic structure, highly

value-charged with hope, freedom, and flexibility.
cited breaks the status quo
f set

— the

Each example

failure of urban schools, the

iveness of most community agencies, and the insipid monotony

of most commercial television.

They explode the myth that non-

professionals and non-experts cannot contribute to and change
institutionalized education.
All of the informal, non-public, and non-school alternatives

have in common freedom from the difficult problems of classroom

management and school bureaucracy.
volunteers

— no

Because their clients are

truancy laws enforce attendance

— they

have to provide

a needed service, be entertaining and empathetic, and respond to

individual needs.

Beyond empathy and entertainment they only succeed

to the degree that they have something to offer.

They are, in part,

.
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a

mirror of what is not being done in public
education and community

services

.

111

CHAPTER

V

URBAN EDUCATION AND CHANGE

Although theories about how to change
institutions have seldom
dealt directly with urban schools, change
agents in urban education

have been tempted to turn to identified experts
in change theory.
The result of their frustration has been two
myths:

First, that

research will finally reveal a recipe for the design
and implementation of educational change

— as

soon as enough time and money is spent

on research.

Second, that "the more schools change, the more they

stay the same"

— the
1.

Iti

myth of powerlessness.

The Myth of a Recipe for Change

the field of urban education in particular, change theory

has been woefully inadequate to describe the complex interactions of

institutionalized white racism which have produced unequal education.
The search for useful change theories in urban education has been

discouraging.

A major branch of educational change theory has been

modeled after studies in industrial settings, as though schools and
factories have a lot in common.

A recent survey of the literature

on educational change theory concluded that "the practicing school

administrator can find very little practical help in the literature
for planning and managing, and dealing with the problems of change."^

^Louis Maguire, Observations and Analysis of the Literature on
Change (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Research for Better Schools, Inc.,
June 197 0)
1
p
.

,

,

.

.

.

y
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Contemporary change theorists usually strive
to present

a

convincing, discrete set of analytical factors,
implying that management techniaue is the key to change for the better.

postulated three steps in the change process:
and re-freezing at a new level." 2

processes:

Kurt Lewin

"unfreezing, moving,

Egon Guba described three change

evoluntary (unplanned)," "homeostatic or reactive,"

and "neomobilistic or planned" change.

3

The National Training

Laboratories suggested a model of planned change which had eight
phases, from diagnosis of the problem to providing, support for the

changed behavior, and termination of the helping relationship

4

Warren Bennis defined eight types of change, focusing on the relationship between a change agent and client system, and ranging from

democratic, "planned change" or "coercive

»"

and "emulative

change

The student of change theorv, or the educational innovator
looking for guidance, feels overwhelmed and confused bv the endless

2

Kurt Lewin, "Ouasi-Stationarv Social Equilibria and the Problem
First Edition,
Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, editors
(New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961).
of Permanent Change," The Planning of Change

,

Egon G. Guba, "A Model of Change for Instructional Development."
Paper presented for the Educational Media Conference, Indiana
University, June, 1968.
^

Reading Book Twentieth Annual Summer Laboratories in Human
National Training
Relations Training (Washington D. C.
Laboratories, 1966).
,

,

:

^Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York:
Hill Book Company, 1966).

McGraw-
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"lists" and seemingly disconnected, self-contained
systems.
is no one set of answers, are there any
answers at all?

If there

William

McClelland, a leader in motivational research,
readily admits the
dilemma:

"It is premature to do more than wish for a
general model,

let alone a general theory of change and changing.

researchers have developed

a

Accordingly,

variety of subsystem models, each of

which deals with some aspect of the change process or with
some
specific setting.

The implication in McClelland's statement is that

change theory is a young field which is developing into a
science.
That prediction seems overly optimistic.
For the student of urban education, the most useful sources of

change literature still lie in case studies which document the change
process.

Few examples exist in the published literature.

include:

Reginald Damerell's Triumph in a White Suburb

tion; David Roger's 110 Livingston Street

,

,

The best
on integra-

about the New York City

educational bureaucracy: and Marilvn Gittell and Maurice Berube's

Confrontation in Ocean-Hill Brownsville
Strike.

,

about the New York Teacher's

Such studies at least provide some of the scope and complexity

of urban educational change, the raw materials for understanding

change processes in a broader context.
The Director of Research at the Pennsylvania Advancement School
in Philadelphia, Saul Yanofsky, reported that his goal to support

^William A. McClelland, "The Process of Effecting Change."
Paper presented to the Division of Militarv Psychology, Division 19,
of the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, San
Francisco, September, 1968.

a

114

educational change through research went
through three stages:
In the first year, he tried to adapt the
best of educational research
to studying the school's

inadequacy of

progress— and was often frustrated with the

iv-nts

’

.

In the second year, he discovered

that whatever his research findings, they had
little or no bearing

on whether the school was supported within the
system

exigencies were far more relevant.

— political

Finally, he concluded that his

most useful role was in stimulating historical documentation
of the
school through films, personal statements, and documentaries

—

retreat from psychometrics to a human record of what happened. 7

A recent book by Semour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School
anc^ the

Problem of Change

,

is perhaps the bravest effort to generalize

the specific content of change in schools.

In Sarason 's words, "we

do not possess adequate descriptions of the change process so as to

allow us to begin to understand the high frequency of failure or the
occasional successes."

8

His contribution is

a

lucid, thorough

description of the problem of understanding change processes in
educat ion.

Sarason reiterates the inadequacy of change theory and research

modeled after studies in industrial settings:

"Whereas

I

have stronglv

emphasized the need for descriptions of the modal process of change...

7

From an interview with Saul Yanofsky at Pennsylvania Advancement
School, Fall, 1970.
O

Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem
Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 60.

of Change (Boston:

:
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these writers (for the most, part) seem to assume
that we know the

modal process."

The thematic question running through the
book is,

How is it that the more things change, the more they
stay the same?
Sarason draws his answers from extensive experience working
in
schools while establishing the Yale Psycho-Educational
Clinic.

He

begins by pointing out that outsiders (even insiders) do not
recognize
the complexity of resistance to change.
is

The source of the resistance

usually the failure of both the observers and the observed to

think in terms of alternatives

.

Sarason calls for an understanding of the total "school culture"
an ecological approach.

Descriptions of the change process must

include

—

—
—

relationships among professionals within the school
setting
relationships among professionals and pupils
relationships among professionals and the larger
society.

Thus, he devotes a chapter to the principal, "the crucial implementor
of change."

In his observations, most principals view themselves as

victims of external forces and changes
syndrome.

— thus

the "it can't be done"

In another chapter, he points out how snowed under teachers

How can they make

are with the boredom and routine of teaching.

education interesting to children if it bores them?
problems are more true of urban schools with

^Sarason, p. 216.

a

Certainly, those

history of failure

.
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than of suburban schools.

One crucial weakness in Sarason 's

analysis is that he fails to explore the alternative
route of new
staffing patterns as one way out of impossible and
rigid professional
roles

Sarason is at his best when he describes some of the causes
of

resistance to change and the rigidity of educational imagination.
Certain programmatic regularities (such as physical education in
school or self-contained kindergartens) do have alternatives, but

when questioned, arouse tremendous feeling
traditions were being attacked.

— as

if basic

American

In fact, the intended outcomes of

such practices have never clearly been stated, and no one checks to
see if the outcomes actually come about.

For example, most educators

talk about dialogue in the classroom between teachers and students
and emphasize the "discovery process" for students.

Yet in one

study, the frequency of teachers' questions versus students' questions

was about one hundred to one

.

We rarely apply such scrutiny to most

educational processes.
Sarason criticizes instant panaceas for solving educational
problems.

"It

is not

that these single or simple solutions are in

themselves wrong or inadvisable but rather they are viewed as ends,

which if reached will in some mystical way change the quality of life
in the classroom and school.

His emphasis on viewing the total

school culture rules out blaming failures on individuals alone (bad

principals, bad teachers, or disadvantaged children).

lOSarason, p. 225.

.
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Seeing the enormity and complexity of the
problem and recognizing
the difficulty of understanding and initiating
change is not, for

Sarason, a call for defeatism:
are

"There are few things, if any, that

for demonstrating the dynamics of the

prophecy."
of the value of success:

Sarason 's basis for hope echoes the theme

"Recognizing the adversary gives one a

basis for asserting that the problem is neither hopeless nor

insoluble
If change agents would give up trying to find a single explana-

tion and turn to understanding the total environment, they might

recognize that the complexity and connectedness of the "total school
culture" allows for a great variety of approaches.

No matter what

the barrier is, including lack of money, it can be overcome if one
is willing to try alternatives.

2.

Ingredients for Change

Despite all the diversity and variation in examples of successful urban schools, there are some common threads.

These ingredients

are not only common, but readily available in most communities and

schools.
time.

What is needed is the right mix of ingredients at the right

The task for creative leadership is to create the series of

episodes which make up the change process for institutions.

11 Sarason,

p.

227; p.

236.

J

.
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Educational theorists since John Dewey have
known fairly clearly
what good education should look like.

We may not know much about

how children learn, but we do know what settings
and interpersonal
relationships seem copdvc

horning

:

openness and freedom with

adult guidance and peer support; high student
self-image, confidence,
,

and a sense of control over one's own destiny;
reality-based educa-

tion wherein everything outside the school does not
deny what goes
on inside the school; and the hope factor of self
help, participation,

and a foreseeable better future.
In most of the examples cited, an in-depth democratic process
of group planning and participation took place which
involved all

those affected by the changes.

At Parkway and SASSI Prep, frequent

all-school meetings gave students and teachers, frustrated with the
challenge of change,

a

chance to blow off steam and express concerns.

At Luther Seabrook's school, parents were drawn into the planning

process at every opportunity.

In Berkeley, California, the acceptance

of integrated schools rested almost entirely upon the slow, pain-

staking education of the parents and teachers through numerous candid

meetings
Closely related to the element of patient, democratic processes
is the relaxed and warm atmosphere of mutual respect and fun.
a

In

secure environment people feel free to express their ideas and

emotions

— to

learn.

It

is

probably no coincidence that one feels the

same atmosphere on the set of Sesame Street as in the classrooms at

Pennsylvania Advancement School.

In both situations, the full range
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of human emotions and

encouraged, not just

talents— humor
a

,

fear, pride, stubbornness— are

narrow range of behaviors supposedly
suitable

for learning.

In schools without walls, community free
schools, in the open

classrooms in Louisville Focus and Impact schools,
teachers and

administrators are realizing the motivating potential
of
based curriculum.

a

reality-

By facing directly the realities of racism,
poverty

and powerlessness, educators discard a make-believe
world of irrele-

vant lessons and build trust and credibility.

The schools thereby

open their doors to non-professionals from the urban community
and
set students free from the four walls of the classroom.

Vocation

and education, school and real life, become reconnected.

Finally, all the various schools and programs shared in common
a

positive approach.

In Berkeley, Neil Sullivan said that the

schools must integrate "because it is right!"

At I.S. 44 in New York,

Luther Seabrook expects positive results and gets them.

Success rests

on the assumption that human lives can be greatly altered.

"We need

to give black children back their right to dream," Loretta Long,

"Susan" of Sesame Street

,

believes.

"By keeping dreams alive we

keep alive the stamina and motivation to achieve."

When parents,

teachers, and children find the hope factor for themselves, they also
find the hope factor for urban schools.

A study of the kind of leaders who succeed in changing urban

education would prove valuable.

But seeking conclusions on objective

criteria like sex, age, race, educational training, or experience is
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probably futile.

Edythe Gaines is a grandmother, whose
expertise

grew from intimate knowledge of the New
York City schools (and only
incidently from a Harvard Ph.D.).
Puerto Rican, and she is black.

Her district is over fifty percent
Some of the most dynamic principals

in New York ghetto elementary schools are
Jewish.
.

Some reformers

are quite young and daring; some are older and
experienced in the

intricacies of educational politics.

Harvey Scribner, a tough, shrewd New Englander from

a poor,

rural

background, had never dealt with problems of integration
before
Teaneck.

education.

John Bremer brought to Parkway a strict, classical
British

Newman Walker, Superintendent of Louisville, is

a quiet,

—spoken man who firmly believes in humanistic approaches to

problem-solving.

Richardson Dilworth, the man behind the hiring of

Mark Shedd and whose leadership is largely credited for reforming
Philadelphia's municipal structures, is

a

"Mainline" aristocrat.

The role of powerful leadership in creating change is a central
question.

In the examples of school integration, the balance seemed

tipped when educational and civic leaders met the problems head on
and dared to bring out into the open the "hidden agenda" of racism.

The positive approach of principals in holding teachers accountable
and convincing them that their children can learn seems crucial in

urban elementary schools.
On the other hand, strong leadership is often not enough.

Creativity and imagination provide the necessary vision for dramatic
departure from the status quo.

The success of Sesame Street depended
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on the outstanding inventiveness of
its creators and the skillful

research which proceeded it.

The Parkway concept provided a
revolu-

tionary structure for urban high school
education.

Perhaps some

concepts, such as schools without walls or
differentiated staffing
and flexible scheduling, are so dramatic
in the structural changes

they bring that they can survive, once implemented,
without charis-

matic leadership.
In the urban setting, knowledge of the political
framework is

essential.

Without having a good idea of the political consequences

of one s actions, an urban leader will become immobilized.

And yet,

political awareness all too often becomes ensnared in petty selfseeking.

It

is said of

Chancellor Scribner in New York that much of

his power rests on his reputation that "he can't be bought."

As

Edythe Gaines stated, an educational leader will be effective only

when he or she keeps clearly in mind the ultimate goal of improving
education for children.

An educational leader first needs the courage and confidence to
say it can and it will be done.

If he feels he needs to find a

recipe for successful change, he has lost already.

Secondly, he needs

those intangible intuitive skills, the "whimsy" factor, which provide

adaptability and flexibility.

Third, a leader needs to find and

create a series of episodes that go right
risk their going wrong.

— and

he must be willing to

Finally, the vision of what is important

—

the education of children--provides all those involved in the change

process with the belief that the stakes are real and that the goals
are worth trying.
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3.

The Myth of Powerlessness

Too often educational reformers have
either not dared very much
or simply given up.

In self-justification, they have
insisted that

"the more things change, the more they stay
the same."

For those who

equate sophisticated cynicism with wisdom, an
emphasis on the pos-

sibility of progress will seem naive.

The brief answers sketched

here may not be convincing, but may suggest the
direction required
for a deeper understanding of change.

A major part of the answer to the myth of powerlessness
lies
in defining the area and specific type of change being
talked about.

In fact, schools are continually changing.
a higher turnover of personnel and clients.

Few institutions undergo
Communities rapidly

change as suburbs grow and poor and minority people move to the inner

cities

— and

school populations reflect that change.

Secondly, parents

and teachers find that children absorb the changes in the larger

society at an alarming rate and create the "generation gap."
If one’s perspective stretches away from the immediate and

chronic problem of getting curriculum updated and passes lightly over
the extreme examples of classrooms with thirty-year old textbooks, it
is clear that there have been remarkable changes in school curriculum.

Probably the most obvious changes have been in the sciences and in
occupational education.

Social studies, sex education, and languages

have also reflected the dramatic changes in society.

Hopefully, at

long last, more high school students read the Autobiography of
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^S olm

X than Si l as Marner

.

Perhaps the problem is that schools

have not changed fast enough to respond to new student
populations,
the climate of outside opinion, and contemporary events.

When one looks at schools, part of the problem in change
is
merely a problem of management.

It

is,

in fact, an enormous manage-

ment task to orchestrate all the scheduling, orderly interactions,

personnel assignments, financial resources, transportation, meals,
space, and supplies that go into a public school.

The management

problem will remain, whatever the nature of urban schools.

An

environment has to be created in which education can take place.
the content

ture

— is

But

having something to teach within the managerial struc-

the key to successful education.

Urban schools have failed

primarily because they have not taught their students.
It

is

much easier for experts in urban education to agree unon

the need for change than for them to agree about what should be

changed and how.

In general, educational change theorists have looked

for a recipe for successful change and, thus, have been forced to

deal with routines and regularities

— the

managerial problems.

The

goals are stated in terms of a new reading series or a new class

— what

schedule when the real goal is changing what

is taught

useful, meaningful, and enjoyable to learn.

The hopes pinned on each

is

innovation have been larger than it could bear.
The demand for change comes when schools fail to train, educate,
and facilitate learning of those things that their graduates need to
know.

General diplomas instead of academic diplomas and fifth grade

.
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reading level of graduates -condemn urban
schools more than high
dropout rates, truancy, or vandalism.

Even when the problem was correctly identified
as what is

taught-as

in the introduction of the "new

math"-the change strategy

became an attack on programmatic regularities.
teacher had to learn a new educational dogma.

Every elementary

Teachers were often

as threatened by the "new math" as by the old, and
they frequently

transferred that fear to their students.

Although the hope that

more children would be turned on by mathematics was hardly
realized,
the basic direction in curriculum reform was for the better.
It makes a great deal of difference how educational
change is

conceived and implemented.

Changing what is taught is much more

difficult than changing managerial techniques.

We want to teach

something useful that students can enjoy as well.

Finding that

"something" is particularly hard because it relates to future
proj ections

The salient question underlying research in urban education

must finally be:

What are the schools for in our society?

The

failure of urban schools becomes increasingly a crisis as the role
of public education grows in social and economic importance.

Are we,

as Mario Fantini suggested, "asking public schools to become the

major instrumentation for solving many of our social ills
racism, alienation, powerlessness

— while

— poverty,

also responding to the
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manpower needs of an advanced technological
society?" 12

if the

answer to that question is yes, then the
need for success in urban
schools, and for research which can both
document and stimulate that

success is also the key to the future health
of American society.
It

is extremely important that urban schools,
alone, not be

saddled with the task of producing change models for
American education.

In a sense, their task is easier

— equality

is the goal.

What-

ever the flaws within the American educational system,
the first

task of urban schools is to insure that poor and minority
children
have equal access and results within that system.

Finding what to teach and how to teach
lenge to educational change.

it

is the greatest chal-

Certainly, changing managerial struc-

tures and routines can facilitate that search.

If the search is,

in fact, a continuous one, then schools must become self-renewing

institutions in which students, teachers, administrators, and parents
can determine the directions of the search.

4.

The Illusion of Power and the Hope Factor

Successful change strategies rest directly on creating an illusion of power

— on

convincing people that they have a voice in decisions

and an impact on what happens.

phrase, made up of individuals.

12

Institutions are, however trite the
The shape and directions of

Mario Fantini, "Educational Agenda for the Seventies and
Beyond," from Needs of Elementary and Secondary Educat ion for the
Seventies, compiled by the General Subcommittee of Education of the
House Committee on Education and Labor, p. 191.

.

.
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institutions depend most upon the hopes,
fears, and expectations of
people.

At crucial stages, when institutional
decisions are in the

balance, the outcome turns upon creative
leadership which builds
on pos it ivt’hiopes' \'al¥i^c*^han plays on
fears.

Urban schools^-because they have been programmed
for failure
by a larger white racism— convey exaggerated
fears and a diminished

sense of power.

Because success cannot be taken for granted
in

urban schools, it is crucial to create the illusion of
power.
Success, therefore, is the prime component of creating
success.

Predicting failure almost guarantees failure.

Urban teachers and

administrators who believe they will succeed usually find their faith
justified

.

Every urban teacher can find another teacher who succeeds

5

urban school can find another school that succeeds; every district and every city can look to an urban district or system that

succeeds
The purpose of this study has been, not to create an elaborate

theory of change, but to take the crucial first step in breaking
the myth of failure in urban education.

"It is the successful

experiment which is decisive and not the thousand-and-one failures

which preceeded it.

More is learned from the single success than

from the multiple failures.
,

done

A single success proves it can be

,,13

^Robert Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," The Antioch
Review Summer, 1948 (reprinted in Merton, Social Theory and Social
Free Press, revised and enlarged edition, 1957).
Structure, New York:
,
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Emphasizing success

in.

this study has started with the
recogni-

tion that the urban poor, and especially
black Americans, have been

denied membership in the American Dream of
upward mobility and
progress.

The challenge to urban schools is to share
that dream— to

recreate the hope factor for poor and minority
children.
The hope factor "touches on the core of humanness—
the fact
that men wish to strive, wish to be important, and
wish to do some-

thing significant with their lives.

democracy work.

The hope factor makes

When urban schools deny hope, they denv

a

viable

future for American society.

1Z

*From the introduction to Urban Educat ion:
(Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1972).

The Hone Factor
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
Chapter

I

The major resource for the ideas in Chapter

I

has been mv

activities in the Center for Urban Education, from January, 1969, to
the present.

I

learned most about urban education while working to

establish programs, to build
to the Center,

curriculum, to recruit new members

a

and while teaching an undergraduate course. "Intro-

duction to Urban Education."

I

traveled to schools in Hartford,

Connecticut; Pasadena, California* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: and

New York City and had the opportunity to meet with teachers, students,
administrators, community leaders, and federal program coordinators.
I

learned most about the problems and prospects for an integrated

society through participating in building an integrated team of
faculty and students in the Center.

Several major nation-wide studies have examined the failure of

urban education and have documented the extent of racial separation
in American schools:

James A. Coleman, E quality of Educ a tional

Opportunity (Washington:

G.P.O., 1966); U.

S.

Commission on Civil

Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools (Washington:
1970 )

;

and Wilson C. Riles, Urban Education Task Force Report

C.P.O.,
:

Report of the Task Force on Urban Education to the Department of

Health, Education and Welfare (New York:

Praeger, 1970).
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Four books in particular do an outstanding
job of presenting
the individual and collective histories of
the victims of white

racism in America:
York:

Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm
X (Mew

Grove Press, 1966); Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto

S o cial P ower

(New York:

:

Dilemmas of

Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1965);

Elliot Liebow, Tally’s Corner (Boston:

Little Brown, 1967); and

Louis Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt, eds., Institutional
Racism in

America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

Prentice-Hall, 1969).

Charles Silberman's Crisis in Black and White (New York:
House, Vintage Books, 1964) remains

a

Random

good summary of racism and the

struggle for civil rights.

William Ryan's Blaming the Victim (New York:

Random House,

1971); Charles Valentine's Culture and Poverty (Chicago:
of Chicago Press,

1968); and Samuel F. Yette's The Choice

Issue of Black Survival in America (New York:
1971)

G.

P.

University
:

The

Putnam's Sons,

from a powerful triumverate of denials to the myths that have

shifted the blame for failure in urban education from the schools to
the children and their families.

Four contemporary studies of urban education offer proof that

success does and can occur:
in Citv Schools

(New York:

Eleanor Leacock, Teaching and Learning
Basic Books, 1969); Robert Rosenthal and

Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom

:

Prophecies and Teacher Expectations (New York:
Winston, 1968); Charles

E.

Self-Fulfilling
Holt, Rinehart and

Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New
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York:

Random House, 1970); and Atron A. Gentry,
et

E ducation

The Hope Factor (Philadelphia:

:

.

al., Urban

W. B. Saunders, 1972).

Chapter II

The primary sources for Chapter II are the
two documentations
of integration in Teaneck, New Jersey and
Berkeley, California:

Reginald Damerell, Triumph in

White Suburb (New York:

Morrow

and Company, 1968) and Neil Sullivan and Evelyn S.
Stewart, Now

l£ The Time:

Integration In The Berkeley Schools (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1970).
The most reasoned and convincing discussion of the need for

integration to end racial fears and antagonisms is Thomas

F.

Pettigrew’s "Racially Separate or Together," Journal of Social Issues
25, No.

1,

1969, pp. 43-69.

,

Raymond W. Mack’s Our Children's Burden:

Stud ies of Desegregation in Nine American Communit ies (New York:

Random House, 1968) describes the slow process of integration in

American schools.
Many newspaper and magazine articles, too numerous to list here,
have described schools which have integrated through bussing.

In the

flurry of election-year campaigning in spring, 1972, feature articles
and television specials have depicted the successes and failures of

school integration.
It

is probably premature to make conclusive statements about the

effects of integrated schools on students’ achievement and self-image.
In "Race and the Outcomes of Schooling" in On Equality of Educational
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O pportunity

York:

,

Frederick Hosteller and Daniel

P.

Moynihan, eds.

Random House, 1972), David K. Cohen, Thomas

F.

(New

Pettigrew,

and Robert T. Riley cite the extensive research
of Professor Irwin

Katz that "black subjects performed best in inter-racial
situations
free of stress and threat, moderately well in all-Negro
situations,
and worst in inter-racial situations characterized by
stress and

threat." (p. 359)

In recent studies by Nancy St. John and M. S.
Smith,

black children achieved higher in integrated schools yet reported
higher educational aspirations in segregated schools.

One explana-

tion, the authors hypothesize, could be the effects of racism on

black children in integrated schools.

Another, put forward by Irwin

Katz, is that "the high aspirations of lower-status Negro children
in overwhelmingly Negro schools tend to be rigid and unrealistic"
(p.

364)

,

leading to disappointment and despair when the child cones

in contact with the larger society.

Chapter III

The primary sources for Chanter III were on-site visits to

urban schools and programs and interviews with people connected with
those programs.

Several books and articles, however, were useful:

Charles E. Silberman's Crisis in the Classroom (New York:
House, 1970); George Dennison's The Lives of Children

:

Random

A Practical

Description of Freedom in its Relat ion to Growth and Learning
Story of the First Street School (New York:

Henry

S.

Resnik's Turning on the System

:

:

The

Random House, 1969:

War in the Phi ladelphia
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Public Schools (New York:

-Random House, Pantheon Books,
1970); and

George Weber's study, "Inner-City Children
Can Be Taught To Read:
Four Successful Schools," Washington, D. C.:

Council for Basic

Education, Occasional Papers Number Eighteen,
1971.

The taped

interview with Edythe Gaines, former Superintendent
of District 12
in the Bronx, made by Reginald Damerell, filled
a crucial gap in

providing the success story of an entire inner-city district.
In fall, 1970,

I

visited New York City and interviewed Luther

Seabrook at I.S. 44 and Sol Levine, Principal of John Dewey High
School, during a visit to the school in Brooklyn.

Talking with

John C. Woodbury, Assistant to the Chancellor, was very helpful—
and his assistance in setting up the interviews was invaluable.

Also in fall, 1970,

I

went to Philadelphia and visited the

Parkway Project and Pennsylvania Advancement School.

I

briefly with John Bremer, then Director of Parkway, at

a time

his personal struggle with Mark Shedd was at its peak.
a

spoke

I

when

visited

highly-publicized and emotional public school board meeting in

which the closing of Paxon School, the elementary component of
Parkway, was discussed.
In fall, 1971, I visited Pennsylvania Advancement School again

and spoke extensively with Saul Yanofsky, Director of Research.

that time, shortly after the election of Frank Rizzo,

I

At

talked with

various Philadelphians about the prospects for the schools and the
imminent ousting of Superintendent Mark Shedd.
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Information on the Louisville Schools was
derived from written
proposals from the district and from conversations
with various
School of Education personnel who served as consultants
to the district.

Similarly,

I

learned about METRO school in Chicago from

written documents about the school and from talking with
Mike
Greenebaum at the School of Education who was with Urban Research,
Inc.
when they set up the school with the Chicago Board of Education.
To learn about other system-wide strategies for change,

I

had

the opportunity in the fall of 1969 to visit Southwest Regional

Lab in Los Angeles.

Members of the Washington Innovations Team have

made periodic visits to the School of Education.

Several of the

innovative schools and programs, in fact, have given presentations
as part of the School of Education Marathon Weeks.

Chapter IV

Various articles, cited in Chapter IV, have provided information
on community free schools, mini-schools, and street academies.

I

also

had the opportunity to interview people directly involved with street

academies:

William Smith, original Director of SASSI Prep, and Nat

Rutstein, closely associated with Harlem Prep.

Students and teachers

from SASSI Prep also visited the School of Education during Marathons.

My primary source for information on Westside Study Center has
been Atron A. Gentry, founder and Director of the Center, and various
other people affiliated with Westside who are now at the School of

.
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Education.

I

also visited the Westside Study Center
in Pasadena in

fall, 1969.

The highlight of

research for Chapter IV came in a visit

ray

in fall, 1970, to Sesame Street in New York
City.

"Susan” of

S esame

Str eet

,

Loretta Long,

spoke to me at length about the program

and invited me to visit the studio and watch a show
in progress.
I

also visited the Research Department at Children's Television

Workshop and talked with Evelyn Davis, Director of Utilization,
and
Charley Smith, her assistant.
of Children

s

(Mrs. Davis is now a Vice-President

Television Workshop and Mr. Smith is the new Director

of Utilization.)

Chapter V

A classic study of change theory

Warren

G.

is The

Planning of Change bv

Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (New York:

Rinehart and Winston, Second Edition, 1969).

Holt,

Louis M. Maguire has

published both a thorough (though discouraging) summary and analysis
of the literature on change and an annotated bibliography:

"Observa-

tions and Analysis of the Literature on Change" and "An Annotated

Bibliography of the Literature on Change" (Philadelphia:
for Better Schools, Inc., June/July, 1970).

discuss change in schools is Seymour

B.

Research

The bravest attempt to

Sarason's The Culture of the

School and the Problem of Change (Boston:

Allyn and Bacon, 1971)

But no research or theory on change is very helpful in discussing

urban education.

For future research, a useful approach might be to
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study leadership and innovative structures
on a small scale.

Valuable

conclusions could be reached by studying, for
example, how well successful change strategists survive in new situations:

Harvey Scribner

as both Superintendent of Teaneck and Chancellor
of New York City

Schools; Neil Sullivan as both Superintendent of Berkeley
and

Commissioner of Education in Massachusetts;

Edythe Gaines as both

District Superintendent and Director of the Cooperative
School Project

Atron Gentry as both founder of Westside Study Center and Director
of
the Center for Urban Education at the University of Massachusetts.

Another first step might be to look at various innovative structures and investigate their impact in different settings:

Parkway model which is now being implemented in half

a

the

dozen cities;

flexible scheduling at John Dewey and other urban high schools; the
federal Career Opportunities Program model for involving para-

professionals in urban schools in many different cities; and districtwide bussing for total school integration on the Berkeley model.
The most important mandate for future research in urban education is to build up the record of success studies and leave the

realm of "blaming the victims."

By focusing on success, we can move

beyond the hopelessness of repeated failure and beyond the unsatis-

factory conclusion that poor and minority children can only achieve

successfully in integrated schools.
As Herbert Gans has pointed out, "...if the prime purpose of

research is the elimination of poverty, studies of the poor are not
the first order of business; they are much less important than studie's
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of the economy .. .They are also less important
than studies of the

political, social, and cultural factors that permit
the existence
of a poverty-stricken underclass."

Most important, we need to look

closer at racism, social and economic injustice, and the
roles

schools can play in alleviating those injustices and building
"the
hope factor."

